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ABSTRACT 
COMPETITION AND TAX EVASION: 
A CROSS COUNTRY STUDY 
 
by 
WANG Yiqun 
Master of Philosophy 
 
 
This paper investigates the determinants of informality (tax evasion in particular) 
utilizing rich cross-country data of firm-level survey from the World Bank, and 
hypothesizing that competition is a significant factor determining tax evasion 
behaviors. Competition pressure is a key stimulus to induce questionable 
manipulations of tax reporting behaviors. However its effect works at a decreasing 
speed. It is also hypothesized that business obstacles facing firms such as tax 
administration and corruption play significant roles in explaining tax evasion. This 
paper further hypothesizes that firm characteristics such as size, age, ownership are 
important evasion determinants. Empirical results are found supporting these 
hypotheses above. The analysis controls for country-level effects, for instance the 
quality of the legal environment. Industry sectors are also controlled and found 
significant in explaining corporate tax evasion levels. 
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COMPETITION AND TAX EVASION: 
A CROSS COUNTRY STUDY  
 
Chapter One: Introduction 
1. Introduction 
“No government  can announce a  tax  system and  then  rely on  taxpayers’  sense of 
duty  to  remit what  is owed.  Some dutiful people will undoubtedly pay what  they 
owe, but many others will not. Over time the ranks of the dutiful will shrink, as they 
see how they are being taken advantage of by the others. Thus, paying taxes must 
be  made  a  legal  responsibility  of  citizens,  with  penalties  attendant  on 
noncompliance.  But  even  in  the  face  of  those  penalties,  substantial  tax  evasion 
exists—and always has. The history of taxation  is replete with episodes of evasion, 
often  notable  for  their  inventiveness.  During  the  third  century,  many  wealthy 
Romans  buried  their  jewelry  or  stocks  of  gold  coin  to  evade  the  luxury  tax,  and 
homeowners  in eighteenth‐century England  temporarily bricked up  their  fireplaces 
to escape notice of the hearth tax collector (Webber and Wildavsky, 1986, p. 141).” 
                                                       By Slemrod 
(2007) 
 
Underground or informal economic activity is a fact of life all over the globe. 
Schneider and Enste (2000) estimated that during 1990-1993 approximately 10% of 
GDP in the United States was produced by individuals or firms evading taxes or 
engaging in illegal pursuits, while in Africa the figure is 39%-76%, in Asia countries 
13%-70%, and in OECD countries between 13% and 30%. For a quick look at 
United States, Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2000) cited the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
estimates that about 17% of income tax liability is not paid in 1996, accompanied 
with the fact that the relative size of federal corporation income tax revenues dropped 
from 6.4% of GDP in 1951 to less than 1.5% around 2004. Desai (2002) calculated 
that in 1998, difference between tax and book income (approximately $154.4 billion 
or 33.7% of taxable income in U.S.) is consistent with increasing levels of tax 
sheltering during the late 1990s. 
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Abundant real-life examples exist in every societal level, for instance illegal child 
labor in rural districts and unregistered workforce for cost considerations; 
Under-reporting incomes or profits by individual taxpayers or even well-established 
corporations; These prevalent phenomenon exist in many economies. Most 
governments attempt to control these activities by means of punitive measures or 
through education, rather than tax or social security system reforms.  
 
1.1. Coverage and outline of the study 
In this paper, tax evasion issue as a form of corporate tax non-compliance behaviors 
is carefully examined. After first reviewing existing literature and theories in Chapter 
Two and Three, three hypotheses in Chapter Four are developed along the line of 
existing theories, with the most remarking one of competition’s effects on tax 
evasion incentives. After hypotheses developing, Chapter Five utilizes 
comprehensive cross-country survey data to test the previous hypotheses on 
competition, firm characteristics and business constraints. Policy implications and 
limitations of this paper are discussed in Chapter Five. 
 
1.2. Motivations of this thesis 
From the seminal paper on tax evasion by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) (A-S 
henceforth), both theoretical explorations and empirical examinations flourish along 
the line in a number of directions. Empirical attempts to estimate the size of informal 
economy has been well surveyed by Cowell (1990), Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) 
and Cowell (2002); Modifications of the original A-S model include the work by 
Bernasconi (1998)1, Bordignon (1993)2, etc; Tax evasion has also been linked with 
labor market choices, for instance Pestieau and Possen (1991) studies the connection 
between tax evasion and occupational choice, Kolm and Larsen (2004) assumed only 
manual works have access to underground labor market; Optimal taxation has been 
                                                              
1  Bernasconi  (1998)  replaced  expected  utility  with  rank‐dependent  expected  utility,  However  this  does  not 
change  comparative  statistics,  in a way  similar  to  the  introduction of  social  stigma,  renders  the  results more 
restrictive than in the A‐S model.   
2  Bordigon (1993) assumes tax evasion is motivated by taxpayer’s feeling of being treated unfairly, and sees the 
evasion of tax as a social phenomenon and moral issues.   
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also studied by Kolm (1973), Sandmo (1981), Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002); Evasion 
by firms have also been developed from 1980s by Marrelli (1984), with the recent 
trend to introduce the separation of ownership and control.  
 
This paper examines the determinants of tax evasion on firm-level, aside from 
acknowledged external factors such as tax rates, tax administrations and 
country-level effects, existing theories and empirical attempts appear to neglect or 
skip the assumption of market situation and competition status of individual firm 
when deciding evasion behaviors, which could have played crucial role in the game 
of evasion.  
 
Based mainly on the Productivity and the Investment Climate Private Enterprise 
Survey (PICPES thereafter) carried out by the World Bank during 2002 to 2005, 
especially with the special design of the questionnaire with respect to competition 
status of the surveyed firms, a unique opportunity for empirical study emerged for 
combining tax evasion study with respect to competition, which is a rarely covered 
area for cross-country comparisons. 
 
1.3. Main Methodology and Empirical Results 
In the theoretical part of this paper, besides the basic set-up for standard tax evasion 
incentives from Allingham and Sandmo (1972), I further add realistic assumptions 
about utility function, derive specific conditions and predictions for comparative 
static results, especially focusing on competition’s effects on optimal tax evasion. It 
is shown that competition influences evasion incentives (measured by the unreported 
sales as a percentage of total sales), however in a decreasing speed. The hypotheses 
development section mainly illustrates the three hypotheses about effects of 
competition, firm characteristics and business constraints facing firms with intuition 
and explanations from the previous chapter.  
 
In Chapter Five of empirical findings, cross-country evidence supporting the 
4 
 
hypothesized decreasing effect of competition is presented utilizing a unique 
measurement of competition (provided in the survey) and its squared term in 
Maximum Likelihood estimations (MLE). Supplemented by other data sources, the 
main determinants of tax evasion as divided into categories by the three hypotheses 
in Chapter Four are examined. Determinants in the three categories all appear to be 
playing roles according to expected directions. Other factors such as actual tax rates, 
size of underground economy are also taken into considerations in examinations. 
However these factors fail to provide credible effects due to reasons to be explained.  
 
The maximum likelihood estimation method in tobit is applied for main regression to 
back up the previous hypotheses. Marginal effects and predicted effects are also 
presented with respect to different measurements. Other forms of regression as 
robustness checks are also performed. 
 
1.4. Contributions to the Existing Literature 
Evasion of tax creates inequity problem among social members, and if evasion 
opportunities are associated with income (of individuals or firms), government’s 
fiscal attempts are further complicated. Economic costs also arise with the fact that 
evasion activities take resources to operate and conceal evasion, and tax authorities 
also require resources in tax collecting and administrations.  
 
Besides the declining revenue tax evasion renders on government, evasion of tax 
makes the burden of tax and social security contributions heavier, also rendering the 
quality of public good and services unguaranteed or of inadequate quantities than as 
it should be. The phenomenon of erosion of tax base is severe in many economies, 
and most governments attempt to control these activities by means of punitive 
measures or through education, less than by tax or social security system reforms. 
For instance, government may resort to policies including “sporadic crackdowns on 
undeclared economic activities, subsidies and tax breaks for firms that agree to 
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register legally and maintain legitimate tax accounting practices.”3 
 
Existing literature on the issue of tax evasion has covered links with many areas and 
explored different forms of taxes in empirical studies. For instance abundant 
literature in management and corporate finance discusses tax evasion with 
compensation scheme and manager incentives. For instance, Chander (2007) 
characterized optimal tax function when agent is risk averse and the principle aims at 
maximizing social welfare; Often examined areas include also value added tax (VAT) 
and its application with optimal tax design and tax supervision. For instance Fisman 
and Wei (2004) examined China-Hong Kong imports data with VAT and found tax 
rates and misclassifications from high to low-taxed categories determined tax 
evasion. Das-Gupta and Gang (2001) developed a model of tax evasion applied to 
valued added tax; Corporate income tax as another main stream of investigations, has 
also been researched intensively in empirical work.  
 
However, due to limitations of data or applications, much empirical work focuses on 
one specific country, or several countries belonging to a same region or economic 
development. Johnson et al. (2000) for instance, examined tax evasion in two 
post-communism countries and three other eastern European countries. Few 
cross-country empirical studies on tax evasion were performed, especially on 
firm-levels, although theoretical works are more commonly seen. Recent research by 
Dabla-Norris et al.(2007, 2008) are among the exceptions for cross-country evidence 
of tax evasion, in which rich cross-country firm level data were employed from 
World Business Environment Survey (WBES thereafter), carried out by the World 
Bank. Dabla-Norris et al. (2008) re-examined previously acknowledged factors such 
as size of informal sector, tax and regulation burdens, financial development and 
quality of legal system, and presented empirical evidence supporting these 
determinant’s effect on informality of firms (namely, tax evasion), especially the 
importance of the quality of legal framework in reducing informality.  
                                                              
3  Cited from Pratap and Quintin (2006). 
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Based on former studies, this paper explores in detail that competition condition 
significantly affect firm's tax evasion behaviors. Except the broad coverage of cross 
country data in this paper’s empirical findings, this paper acknowledged the previous 
determinants for tax evasion, and further presents new empirical evidence on the 
effect of competition, which distinguishes this paper from previous studies. 
Previously acknowledged factors such as firm size, business obstacles are also 
identified, with further presenting other important determinants such as competition 
and financing channels. As is hypothesized, fierce competition in product market 
would precipitate firms into unlawful manipulations such as misreporting sales to tax 
authorities, as an alternative way to ensure a better after-tax profit to compensate the 
revenue decline. The empirical findings of competition suggests that policies 
designed to promote competition should also take into account factors such as 
strengthening supervision and institution infrastructure, in order to prevent from 
suffering from its possible negative effects and loss of tax revenues.  
 
Besides the evidence found supporting the view that competition plays an important 
role in tax evasion, other interesting facts were found such that firms financing more 
from informal sources also significantly evade more tax, comparing to firms those 
relying more on formal financing channels such as commercial banks or state 
services. This finding corresponds to Cai, Liu and Xiao (2007)’s empirical findings 
that firm’s access to capital markets affects their evasion/avoidance behaviors. It also 
signals the supervising role banks may play in lending loans, indicating another 
policy insight for tax evasion control. Other factors such as corruption, firm-specific 
characteristics and industry and country-level effects are also accounted for. My 
results suggest useful directions for policy makers to strengthen tax supervision. 
7 
 
Chapter Two: Literature Review 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Background of Informality 
Informality has various definitions and controversies have always been existent. I 
mention here one often cited definition to define it as: All economic activities that 
contribute to officially calculated (or observed) gross national product but are not 
currently registered4. Economic activities by this definition include relevant categories 
classified by legitimate nature of transactions as shown in Table 1 below.  
 
Table 1: A Taxonomy of Types of Underground Economic Activities5 
Type of 
Activity Monetary Transactions Non Monetary Transactions
Illegal 
Activities 
Trade with stolen goods; drug dealing 
and manufacturing; prostitution; 
gambling; smuggling; fraud; etc. 
Barter of drugs, stolen 
goods, smuggling etc. 
Produce or growing drugs 
for own use. Theft for own 
use. 
  Tax Evasion Tax Avoidance
Tax 
Evasion 
Tax 
Avoidance 
Legal 
Activities 
Unreported income 
from self-employment; 
Wages, salaries and 
assets from unreported 
work related to legal 
services and goods 
Employee 
discounts, 
fringe 
benefits 
Barter of 
legal 
services 
and goods 
All 
do-it-yourself 
work and 
neighbor help 
 
Tax incompliance in taxable transactions for this paper’s scope can be generally 
summarized as either tax-evading or tax-avoiding activities. Despite the technical 
difficulties and controversies in clearly distinguishing between tax avoidance and tax 
evasion, which are both under the category of tax noncompliance, the often cited 
distinction between the two is legitimacy. As avoidance is still in the legal side, evasion 
is at the other. Tax avoidance usually refers to behaviors taking loopholes in tax laws 
and relevant regulations, avoiding taxation over certain items or reducing tax liabilities 
                                                              
4  This definition has been utilized for instance, by Feige (1989, 1994), Schneider (1994a, 2003), Frey and 
Pommerehne (1984), and Lubell (1991). Do‐it‐yourself activities(housework, etc) are not included. 
5  See Schneider, Klinglmair 2004, p6.   
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within a legally registered firm or individual. For instance corporations can purchase 
tax-exempt bonds to reduce taxability; Another often-mentioned tax avoidance refers to 
the extreme situation that firms per se are informal, unregistered, thus avoid all taxation 
and other formal regulations (Underground or illegal economic activities, 
undocumented jobs, to name a few). While avoiding all formal taxations, these firms at 
the same time face many limitations such as higher cost of capital and other concerns.  
 
Tax avoidance, despite its legitimate nature, has caught much attention recently, 
especially abusive avoidance activities, for instance tax shelters. The General 
Accounting Office in the United States defines abusive shelters as "Very complicated 
transactions promoted to corporations and wealthy individuals to exploit tax loopholes 
and provide large, unintended6 tax benefits"7. Slemrod (2003) indicates abusive tax 
shelters roughly equal more than half of the total corporate tax gap in the United States8. 
Although large in magnitude and raising deputes in tax morale and relating issues, the 
legality of avoidance tax activities is immune from criminal investigations and not as 
intriguing in policy implications as tax evasion does, which is the focus of this paper.  
 
This paper focuses on illegal behaviors in corporate tax non-compliances: Tax evasion 
issue in legal activities (by registered firms in this paper’s scope), which is also in the 
keen interest of governments and tax authorities. Evasion activities take various forms 
for different taxes (GST9, corporate income tax, profit tax, etc) and are becoming 
increasingly complicated and professionally done over the recent years. Means utilized 
for evasion purpose varies, including such as under-reporting sales or profits (fake 
receipts, falsifying cost, hiding away activities or reporting loss, etc) to retain illegal 
profits within corporation, which is a major concern for most government.   
 
2.1.1. Broader informality: size of informal sector 
                                                              
6  The word "unintended" here refers to the intention of legislators, not promoters or tax payers (Slemrod (2003)). 
7  U.S General Accounting Office, 2003, p.1 
8  Total corporate tax gap comprises of under‐reporting (tax evasion, in other words), non‐filing and underpayment. 
While U.S corporate underreporting in 2001 is estimated at 29.9 billion, however there's no estimate for non‐filing, 
and underpayment is a quite different issue from this paper's concern. 
9  GST, goods and services tax, as used in Canada, New Zealand, etc. 
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Most existing theories presume several reasons for informal (or underground, shadow) 
economies: Heavy tax and/or regulation burden, high entry barriers, poor institutional 
quality, corruption or mafia distortion, forced reduction of weekly working time, 
unemployment, decline of civic virtue and tax morale, etc.  
 
Methods used to estimate the size of informal economy include direct approaches, 
which employ either well-designed surveys and samples or the discrepancy between 
declared income and that measured by selective checks; And also indirect approaches, 
which utilize indicators such as discrepancy between national expenditure and income 
statistics, discrepancy between official and actual labor force, transaction measure, 
currency demand, physical input (electricity consumption) to trace the informal 
economy; And model approaches, which absorb multiple causes and effects for informal 
economy over time by constructing DYMIMIC (dynamic multiple-indicators 
multiple-causes) models to estimate the size and movement of informal economy. 
 
Schneider and Enste (2000) estimate shadow economies by electricity consumption and 
currency demand for developing, transition and OECD countries. Empirical attempts 
like this have been criticized on various grounds. To list a few, not all transactions in the 
informal economy are paid in cash or require much electricity; Velocity of money 
differs in formal and informal world; Technical progress may bias the estimates of 
informal production and output from for the indirect approaches, etc. More recent trend 
is to employ MIMIC model, sometimes combined with cash-demand model.  
 
Loayza (1996) presents a view that informal economy arises when excessive taxes and 
regulations are imposed by government that lacks the capability to enforce compliance, 
and used data in Latin American countries in the early 1990s to back up the view. 
Friedman et al. (2000) investigated into determinants of underground economy in 69 
countries, and found higher taxes, more labor restrictions, and poorer quality of 
institutions (corruption, bureaucracy, legal environment) all playing roles in determining 
the size of the underground economies. 
10 
 
 
Shleifer (2002) points out that countries with heavier regulation of entry have higher 
corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not necessarily better quality of public 
or private goods. Number of procedures, time and cost of a typical business start-up in 
85 countries was employed to back up this point. 
 
As most of us would expect, tax rate as a primary concern of tax burden, is also a key 
incentive for evasion behaviors in many occasions. Recent work by Fisman and Wei 
(2004) explore the relationship between tax rates and tax evasion, using export-import 
data from China and Hong Kong. They find tax evasion (of value added tax) positively 
related to tax rates, negatively correlated with tax rates on closely related products, 
suggesting misclassification from higher-taxed categories to lower-taxed ones as a 
source of evasion, in addition to underreporting the value of imports. However, in the 
previous work by Friedman et al. (2000), empirical evidence shows higher tax rates are 
associated with less unofficial activity as a percent of GDP, but corruption is associated 
with more unofficial activity, thus suggesting entrepreneurs going underground not to 
avoid taxes but to reduce bureaucracy and corruption burden. As one possible yet 
controversial determinant for tax evasion, this paper also tests the role that actual tax 
rates play in evasion decisions in the later empirical part and found no evidence 
supporting its effect in this paper’s context. 
 
2.1.2. Narrow informality in our scope: tax noncompliance decisions 
Compared with the broader informality, which explains in macro level the size of 
underground economy (e.g. output from unregistered firms and undocumented jobs, etc), 
narrower definitions of informality focus on firm or individual level, which mainly 
focus to the informal tax activities within legally registered firms: “The part of tax 
liabilities that is legally owned but not reported or paid”10.  
 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972)’s seminal work on income tax evasion is probably still 
                                                              
10  Cited from Slemrod (2000) 
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the most important and irradiative work in the field of tax evasion, in their theoretical 
analysis, static and dynamic aspects of the decision to evade taxes are examined, with 
simple and intuition conclusions on the optimal evasion issue, their model structure will 
be further discussed in the next section. Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) have reviewed and 
expanded the discussion of optimal tax responses and suggested policy implications 
regarding tax structure changes.   
 
Individual tax noncompliance is a fiscal concern which has caught much public 
attention, however accurate statistics of individual tax noncompliance is difficult to 
obtain. Previous efforts have either base on audits of tax returns or from household 
survey data. Besides these methods of using data from audits and tax authorities (Tax 
Compliance Measurement Program of the IRS in U.S. is a frequently cited example), 
Pissarides and Weber (1989) (PW thereafter) developed a pioneering alternative to 
estimate self-employed taxpayer compliance without relying on audit programs, by 
assuming same preferences regarding food of self-employed households and regular 
employees. The differences by employment status in the relationship between reported 
income and food expenditures are attributed to underreporting11. The PW method has 
been applied and developed to examine other countries. For instance Feldman and 
Slemrod (2007) presented new evidence from unaudited tax returns in US using the PW 
method, taking the differences in the relationship between charitable contributions and 
the source of income as measurement of individual tax evasion12.  
 
Regarding corporate tax noncompliance, recent trend in the empirical study is to employ 
firm-level data to explore its determinants. Aureo and Scheinkman (2007) present two 
related equilibrium models of determinants for tax noncompliance (tax avoidance in 
their scope), and test implications utilizing survey data of more than 48,000 small 
underground firms in Brazil. They find the interaction of manager’s education and 
formality positively correlated with firm size. Their contributions also lie in the role of 
VAT for transmitting informality, and predict informality of a firm is correlated to the 
                                                              
11  They estimated income tax evasion of self‐employed in UK is around 35%. 
12  They found implied amount of noncompliance significant and varying by source of income. 
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informality of firms from which it buys or sells. However the chain effect of credit 
system vanishes when VAT is applies only at some stage of production.  
 
Notably among recent empirical works for corporate tax noncompliance, Johnson et al. 
(2000) found bureaucratic corruption significantly associated with tax evasion in five 
eastern European countries, after controlling for other determinants such as tax rates, 
incidence of mafia protection and faith in court system; Dabla- Norris et. al. (2008) 
review former studies on acknowledged factors such as tax, regulation, financial market 
and legal system, and show13  that the quality of legal framework is crucial in 
determining the size of informal sector, while firm size, financing constraints, and legal 
obstacles also playing important roles, concluding that higher tax and regulatory burden 
reduce firms' formal operations. Empirical results are reported to back up the point that 
higher tax and regulatory burden reduce firms' formal operations. Their latest IMF 
working paper extends the line to firm growth, with empirical evidence supporting the 
role that tax evasion plays as an important channel (together with regulatory and other 
policy constraints) through which affecting firm growth.  
 
This paper deals exclusively on tax evasion issue, which is regarded as a subcategory of 
informality, as illustrated in Table 1. Broader definition of informality often refers to the 
underground economy, which remains in the illegal and shadow side of economic 
activities, is not in the scope of this paper.  
 
2.2. Competition issue 
Competition has been traditionally viewed as a tool for achieving efficiency and greater 
social welfare. However its negative effects have also been subject to controversies.  
 
Theoretical discussions and analyses have covered topics such as information content 
on performance measures, role of managerial inputs, probabilities of liquidation and 
strategic incentive contracting, etc. However generally, these analyses indicate 
                                                              
13  They used survey data from WBES (World Business Environment Survey), which is carried out by World Bank. 
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ambiguous effect of competition on managerial efforts and firm performances. To name 
a few, Milgrom and Roberts (1992) point that moral hazard could be induced by 
competition pressure in the savings and loan (S&L) industry in the United States, with 
managers gambling on risky investment for survival; Schmidt (1997) also illustrates the 
ambiguous effect of competition, showing increasing competition increases firm's 
liquidation probability and therefore increase managerial incentives, but also reduces 
the firm’s profit, which makes high efforts unattractive, thus the total effect is 
ambiguous.  
 
Unethical activities induced by over-competition are also presented by Shleifer (2004): 
Child labor, corruption, earnings manipulation and excessive executive pay. Shleifer 
further argues that it's sometimes far from obvious that discouraging these censured 
activities is efficient. Cummins and Nyman (2005) presented another dark side of 
competition, when firms know better than customers the benefits of different 
alternatives, competition pressure may inhibit efficiencies by forcing firms to cater 
excessively to customer opinions. These works illustrate the point that effects of 
competition depend on the tools firms reply in order to compete in the market. 
Therefore when firm use illegal or socially-selfish means to cope with competition 
pressure, the outcome could be morally controversial or socially undesirable. And as 
one of the most direct ways to relieve competition pressure, tax evasion to retain profits 
will equip firms with more resources, financial flexibilities, and thus more advantageous 
than their competitors, which is under this paper’s scrutiny.  
 
Literature on the specific impact of competition on tax evasion issue is quite limited, 
often exploring broadly but ambiguously on the manager's incentives under competition 
pressure. For an interesting lab experiment, Schwieren and Weichselbanmer (2008) 
show that competing for a desired reward does not only affect individual’s performance, 
but also their tendency to cheat. In their experiments, poor performers significantly 
increase cheating behaviors under competition pressure, due to reasons such as 
face-saving or attempting to retain a chance of winning. 
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As a most relevant attempt and a closer look into developing countries, Cai, Liu and 
Xiao (2007) employ data of more than 20,000 large-and-medium-sized industrial firms 
in China during 1995 to 2002, and find that firms in more competitive environment and 
relatively disadvantageous positions hide larger shares of profits. Their paper suggests 
policies providing equal opportunities for enterprises to avoid firms seeking unlawful 
means to compensate such disadvantages. Cai, Liu and Xiao (2007) is by far the most 
relevant empirical work directly supporting the adverse effect that competition could 
bring to firms: Tax evasion or avoidance (As the two activities are not distinguished in 
their paper), as underlying incentives to seek compensation for competition pressures. 
In that paper, a theoretical model is developed and testable hypotheses are presented, 
that a firm’s incentive to hid profits are positively correlated with product market 
competitiveness, negatively correlated with its accessibility to capital market, and firms 
with disadvantageous market positions tend to have stronger incentives to hide profits. 
Their empirical analysis controlled for firm characteristics, and found firms facing 
higher tax rates, tighter financial constraints and smaller sizes report lower profit for 
each unit of imputed profit, consistent with their theoretical predictions.  
 
In Cai, Liu and Xiao (2007), three measures of competition are utilized: The number of 
firms, concentration measure and industry average profit margin. The measure of tax 
evasion or avoidance14 comes from the differences between calculated and reported 
profits. They acknowledge that the calculated profit (from deducting intermediate inputs 
from gross outputs) could differ from true accounting profit for several reasons15, and 
assume that the imputed profit and true accounting profit are positively correlated to 
guarantee the validness of their findings, as the theoretical predication and empirical 
findings both deal with sensitivity of tax evasion (which is the reported profits to 
imputed profits). Robust results are presented with OLS regressions and 2SLS 
regressions instrumented for imputed profit and competition. In the latest empirical 
                                                              
14  Their work does not distinguish between evasion and avoidance behaviors.   
15  The difference is mainly due to differences in revenue and expenses recognition rules. For instance, gross output 
in the current year may convert to revenues in many years; Depreciation rules may also differ; Tax credits and tax 
loss carry‐overs may also enlarge the computing errors.   
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paper by Cai and Liu (2009), similar results are found that firms in more competitive 
environments engage in more tax avoidance activities, with robust and consistent results. 
Except in addition a natural experiment is investigated on competitive environment 
(lifting of restrictions on foreign investment) for two industries in China. Besides, 
3-digit and 4-digit industry classifications are utilized, instead of the 2 and 3-digit 
classifications in their previous work.  
 
This paper extends the line of argument that competition pressure would have 
undesirable consequences. As one of many unlawful means to gain relative advantages 
in market and compensating competition’s pressure, firms might engage in illegal 
activities such as tax evasion, or even ultimate tax avoidance16: quit. 
 
In comparisons with Cai and Liu (2009), this paper utilizes rich cross country firm-level 
data from diverse sector and industries, which is providing empirical evidence that 
applies to broader perspectives, while Cai and Liu (2009) adopts data from 
manufacturing firms in China only. As to the competition measure used, the number of 
firms, concentration measures and industry average profit margin are utilized in Cai and 
Liu (2009), which provides more robustness to their findings; this paper uses mainly a 
unique measure on price elasticity (or product substitutability) to approximate the 
competition situation firms face. The measure on tax evasion also differs. Cai and Liu 
(2009) uses the differences between calculated and reported profits as a measure of tax 
evasion, this measure also suffers from arguments that calculated profit could differ 
from true profit for many reasons. The validity of their findings is guaranteed as their 
paper also deals with the sensitivity of evasion. This paper draws its measure on tax 
evasion from a survey question asking about a typical firm’s reporting behavior in its 
industry. The validness and possible criticism of this measure are elaborated in section 
5.2.  
                                                              
16  Tax avoidance mentioned here refers to firm's overall behavior/decision to avoid all forms of taxation by not 
registering and go completely underground. 
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Setup 
3. Theoretical Setup  
3.1. Incentives for tax evasion 
I develop along the line with Allingham and Sandmo (henceforth A-S)(1972)'s seminal 
paper on the formulation of economic model for income tax evasion, and focus on the 
role that competition plays in determining corporate evasion levels.  
 
As in the A-S model, actual taxable income (or profit, sales) Π and corresponding tax 
rate t (ad valorem tax) are exogenously given and known to the tax payer. Tax 
authorities cannot observe the real taxable income without cost; Taxpayers choose to 
report income X to maximize utility17 under the risk of being caught (with probability 
p). If evasion behaviors are detected, penalty would be levied on the under-declared 
income Π െ X  with a penalty rate α (This paper assumes in most cases, penalty rate 
α is higher than tax rate t), formally as: 
EሺUሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ pሻUሺΠ െ tXሻ ൅ pUሾΠ െ tX െ αሺΠ െ Xሻሿ               (1) 
 
For notational convenience, after-tax income is defined as Y ൌ Π െ tX , and 
after-detection income is defined as  Z ൌ Π െ tX െ αሺΠ െ Xሻ, so the expected utility 
could be rewritten as:  EሺUሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ pሻUሺYሻ ൅ pUሺZሻ.  
 
The first-order condition for an interior maximum of the expected utility is as follows: 
െtሺ1 െ pሻUᇱሺYሻ ൅ ሺα െ tሻpUᇱሺZሻ ൌ 0                       (2) 
And the second-order condition is 
D ൌ tଶሺ1 െ pሻUᇱᇱሺYሻ ൅ ሺα െ tሻଶpUᇱᇱሺZሻ                       (3) 
The expected utility satisfies the second-order condition by assumption of concavity of 
utility function.  
 
The existence of interior maximum requires the following corner values of X be 
discussed: 
பEሺUሻ
பX
|Xୀ଴ ൌ െtሺ1 െ pሻUᇱሺΠሻ െ ሺt െ αሻpUᇱ൫Πሺ1 െ αሻ൯ ൐ 0          (4) 
                                                              
17  Von Neumann‐Morgenstern utility function is used here. U’(W)>0, U’’(X)<0. 
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பEሺUሻ
பX
|XୀΠ ൌ െtሺ1 െ pሻUᇱ൫Πሺ1 െ tሻ൯ െ ሺt െ αሻpUᇱ൫Πሺ1 െ tሻ൯ ൏ 0         (5) 
These two conditions could be rewritten into constraints on parameters as 
t ൤p ൅ ሺ1 െ pሻ U
ᇲሺΠሻ
Uᇲ൫Πሺଵି஑ሻ൯
൨ ൏ ݌ߙ ൏ ݐ                     (6) 
The right hand side of the constraint suggested that when expected tax punishment on 
under-reported amount is less than formal tax payment, taxpayers would declare less 
than actual income. In other words, taxpayers will commit tax evasion. This point could 
be also be seen from another perspective as: Each dollar of evasion will yield a payoff 
of t with probability (1-p), together with a penalty of α with probability p, so expected 
payoff of one dollar’s evasion would be: ሺ1 െ pሻt െ pα, While the actual evaded 
amount would be determined by the values of expected payoff and taxpayer's own risk 
preferences.  
 
3.2. Comparative Static Results 
The impact on optimal evasion from factors such as initial income Π, tax rate t, 
punishment strength α, and detection possibility p, is of much importance in both 
theoretical and practical aspects. Comparative static results will be explored into these 
effects, by first employing Arrow-Pratt risk aversion measures, absolute and relative 
risk aversion functions are defined respectively as: 
RAሺWሻ ൌ െ
UᇲᇲሺWሻ
UᇲሺWሻ
  and  RRሺYሻ ൌ െ
UᇲᇲሺWሻ
UᇲሺWሻ
W                  (7) 
 
The above equations (1) to (7) were the same from A-S model, however in A-S model, 
no specific assumptions about the shape of utility function are carried except the general 
consensus of utility’s properties that UԢሺWሻ ൐ 0 and UԢԢሺWሻ ൏ 0. However even on 
that simply-set skeleton, following discussions on comparative static impacts by various 
factors on evasion incentives could not lead to clear-cut conclusions.  
  
In order to explore more specifically into the following effects, this paper assumes a 
quadratic utility function: ܷሺܹሻ ൌ ܹܽ െ ܾܹଶ (where the parameters a>0 and b>0, W 
is wealth, same as the initial income Π in previous context). Therefore, the absolute 
and relative risk aversion from this form of utility function will be: 
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RAሺWሻ ൌ
ଶୠ
ୟିଶୠW
  and  RRሺWሻ ൌ
ଶୠ
౗
W
ିଶୠ
                     (8) 
In this case, both absolute and relative risk aversion are increasing in wealth. 
 
3.2.1. Wealth’s Effect and Competition 
The effects of initial wealth changes on the optimal tax evasion level (which is the 
evasion incentive) are firstly explored, the following equations (9) to (12) are the same 
as those in A-S model.  
 
In order to specify the effects of wealth changes on optimal evasion incentives, 
differentiating the first-order condition in equation (2) with respect to Π, and solve for 
பXכ
பΠ
 will obtain: 
பXכ
பΠ
ൌ ଵ
D
ሾtሺ1 െ pሻUᇱᇱሺYሻ ൅ ሺt െ αሻሺ1 െ αሻpUᇱᇱሺZሻሿ           (9) 
By utilizing the equivalent relation from the first-order condition in equation (2) and the 
risk aversion definitions in equation (7), the above equation (9) could be rewritten as: 
பXכ
பΠ
ൌ െ ଵ
D
tሺ1 െ pሻUᇱሺYሻሾRAሺYሻ െ ሺ1 െ αሻRAሺZሻሿ             (10) 
With the assumption of a quadratic utility function, absolute risk aversion is increasing 
in wealth, therefore RAሺYሻ ൐ RAሺZሻ. Since α ൒ t and is definitely positive, ሺ1 െ αሻ 
will be less than one, therefore the derivative பX
כ
பΠ
 is positive, which means when profit 
increases, optimal declared income will also increase. In other words, when fierce 
competition lowers corporate income, optimal reported income for tax purpose will 
consequently decline. Compared to the same discussion of wealth’s effect In A-S model, 
without any assumptions about utility form and with an assumption of decreasing 
absolute risk aversion, the above equation (10) could be only unambiguously positive 
when α ൐ 1 . The assumption of a penalty rate higher than one implies severe 
punishment upon detection of tax evasion, and oftentimes fails in realty to guarantee the 
positive derivative, as tax authorities do not always collect more than the under-reported 
income ሺΠ െ Xሻ as penalty, but usually fines comparably to the evaded tax amount 
ݐሺΠ െ ܺሻ. In short, பX
כ
பΠ
 is positive as long as absolute risk aversion is increasing, or 
α ൐ 1. Any utility function with increasing ARA, for instance the quadratic utility 
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function used in this paper, or other forms of utility function while α ൐ 1, could 
guarantee the positive sign. 
 
However, the above conclusion considers only the actual amount of evasion, which 
could be misleading if examined solely, as the evasion horizon is constrained by firm’s 
income. The decline of evasion amount could mean no improvement in the firm’s tax 
morale, but possibly due to the declining profits, that firms have less to evade. Thus the 
percentage of evasion is also an interest of study. Researchers and tax authorities may 
need to combine these two aspects in measuring the seriousness of evasion, and check 
into both measures of tax evasion: On actual amount and on evasion percentage. The 
percentage measure of tax evasion shows the severity of evasion issue, and controls for 
the income change. Small firms may have evaded quite limited amount of tax, however 
compared to its total taxability the percentage could seem substantial; while big 
established corporations may have evaded huge amount of money, yet the evasion 
problem seems less serious if compared to its large profits. 
 
The evasion percentage 1 െ X
Π
 reflects the severity of evasion behaviors, and its 
derivative with respect to Π, which is 
பሺଵିX
כ
Π
ሻ
பΠ
, has opposite sign to that of 
பሺX
כ
Π
ሻ
பΠ
. The 
sing of 
பሺX
כ
Π
ሻ
பΠ
 suggests the way how reported percentage will vary when actual taxable 
income varies. As 
பሺX
Π
ሻ
பΠ
ൌ ଵ
Πమ
ሺபX
பΠ
Π െ Xሻ, plugging into equation (9) and (3), will obtain: 
பሺX
כ
Π
ሻ
பΠ
ൌ ଵ
ΠమD
ሾtሺ1 െ pሻUᇱᇱሺYሻY െ ሺα െ tሻpUᇱᇱሺZሻZሿ                (11) 
Again using the relationship in equation 2, the derivative above could be rewritten into: 
பሺX
כ
Π
ሻ
பΠ
ൌ െ ଵ
ΠమD
tሺ1 െ pሻUᇱሺYሻሾRRሺYሻ െ RRሺZሻሿ                  (12) 
 
The above equations (11) and (12) are the same as in A-S, and the property of relative 
risk aversion will determine the sign of 
பሺX
כ
Π
ሻ
பΠ
. The fraction declared will increase, 
decrease, or remain constant if relative risk aversion is increasing, decreasing, or 
constant. By the previous assumption of a quadratic utility function, the relative risk 
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aversion is increasing in wealth: RRሺYሻ ൐ RRሺZሻ. Therefore, the above equation will be 
positive, indicating increasing income renders firms report more and evade less. The 
sign of wealth’s effect suggests mainly an income effect, as if when firms are better-off, 
they have relatively less incentive to evade. Controversies have always been existent 
about whether relative risk aversion is increasing or decreasing, and in both directions 
abundant literature flourishes. The assumption of increasing relative risk aversion 
adopted in this paper does not guarantee or favor either side of the issue, however the 
increasing relative risk aversion is supposed in accordance with the empirical findings 
presented in later content of the paper, that firms with higher corporate income evade 
less tax, ceteris paribus.  
 
As the form of the quadratic utility indicates diminishing marginal utility of wealth, it 
also suggests the possibility of a diminishing income effect on optimal ratio of tax 
evasion. Thus this paper takes again the derivative in equation (11) with respect to Π: 
பమX
כ
Π
பΠమ
ൌ െ ଶ
ஈయD
ሾtሺ1 െ pሻUᇱᇱሺYሻY െ ሺα െ tሻpUᇱᇱሺZሻZሿ        (13) 
 
As െ ଶ
஠యD
 is positive, the sign of the two bracketed terms: tሺ1 െ pሻUᇱᇱሺYሻ െ
ሺα െ tሻpUᇱᇱሺZሻ, will determine the sign of 
பమX
כ
Π
பΠమ
. As the negative first term minus the 
negative second term18, the absolute value of the two terms will determine the sign. Use 
equation (2) to rewrite the second term in the middle brackets, the fraction of the two 
terms is as follows: (Proofs of the equations are attached in the appendix) 
୲ሺଵି୮ሻUᇲᇲሺYሻY
ሺαି୲ሻ୮UᇲᇲሺZሻZ
ൌ
ሺαష౪ሻUᇲሺZሻ
UᇲሺYሻ
UᇲᇲሺYሻY
ሺαି୲ሻ୮UᇲᇲሺZሻZ
ൌ RRሺYሻ
RRሺZሻ
൐ 1              (14) 
With the increasing relative risk aversion of utility functions, RRሺYሻ ൐ RRሺZሻ so the 
fraction is larger than one, thus tሺ1 െ pሻUᇱᇱሺYሻY െ ሺα െ tሻpUᇱᇱሺZሻZ ൏ 0 . The 
derivative 
பమX
כ
Π
பΠమ
 therefore is negative. The sign of equation (14) supports the 
diminishing marginal effect of income on the ratio of tax evasion. Combine equation 
(12) and (13), a positive, yet decreasing effect of wealth appear with respect to the ratio 
                                                              
18  Again, the assumptions that  t ൏ ߙ ൏ 1  and p<1 is used here. 
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of reported percentage X
כ
Π
.   
 
3.2.2. The Effect of Tax Rates  
Apply the same procedures with respect to tax rate t, again differentiate the first-order 
condition (equation 2) with respect to t, and then using equation 2 will lead to: 
பXכ
ப୲
ൌ ଵ
D
Xtሺ1 െ pሻUᇱሺYሻሾRAሺYሻ െ RAሺZሻሿ ൅
ଵ
D
ሾሺ1 െ pሻUᇱሺYሻ ൅ pUᇱሺZሻሿ      (15) 
The second term is unambiguously negative, while the sign of the first term is positive, 
negative or zero according as absolute risk aversion is decreasing, increasing, or 
constant. By the previous assumption of a quadratic utility function, the first term on the 
right hand side is negative, and the overall effect would be negative. These two terms 
have been stated in A-S model as compensating effects (when absolute risk aversion is 
decreasing): The first term as income effect, as higher tax rate leaves taxpayers with less 
money at hand, thus reduce possible evasion horizon, Y and Z as well for any level of X; 
The second term can be regarded as substitute effect, that higher tax rates make evasion 
more attractive at the margin. Thus the two effects render the actual sign of tax rate’s 
effect hard to determine. However, this point is challenged by Yitzhaki (1974) and will 
be discussed later on in section 3.2.5.  
 
3.2.3. The Effect of Punishment 
Use again the above procedures to explore the effect of penalty rate α on declared 
income will obtain: 
பXכ
பα
ൌ െ ଵ
D
ሺΠ െ Xሻሺt െ αሻUᇱᇱሺZሻ െ ଵ
D
pUᇱሺZሻ                (16) 
This time, both terms on the right hand side are positive, suggesting more severe 
punishment leads to an increase in the reported income.  
 
Sometimes the punishing practice regarding small amount evasion is to exert a fixed 
fine besides the α times evasion amount, denoted by C. In such case the expected utility 
becomes: 
EሺUሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ pሻUሺΠ െ tXሻ ൅ pUሾΠ െ tX െ αሺΠ െ Xሻ െ Cሿ           (17) 
Define after-detection income as Zଵ ൌ Π െ tX െ αሺΠ െ Xሻ െ C, then the first-order and 
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second-order condition will be the same as in equation (2) and (3), after replacing Z for 
Zଵ. Again solve for the impact of higher fixed fine C on optimal declared Xכ will 
obtain: 
பXכ
பC
ൌ ଵ
D
ሺα െ tሻpUᇱᇱሺZଵሻ                          (18) 
The sign of the derivative above is unambiguously positive, suggesting increasing fixed 
penalty will deter tax evasion, complementing the predictions as in equation (15).  
 
The consequences of evasion detection do not limit to penalties only, there are many 
other costs associated with detection, such as reputation loss, trial costs, etc. These costs 
vary in different firms and can hardly be measured accurately, especially the 
non-financial costs. The introduction of a fixed fine C also helps to capture and explain 
the phenomenon. A fixed fine can be interpreted as the general condition of loss a firm 
would expect to experience besides the penalty exerted, and a higher value of C would 
signal more serious loss and deters the evasion of tax.  
 
3.2.4. The Effect of Detection Probability 
Finally, differentiate the first-order condition with respect to probability of detection p: 
பXכ
ப୮
ൌ ଵ
D
ሾെtUᇱሺYሻ ൅ ሺt െ αሻUᇱሺZሻሿ                  (19) 
The two terms in the brackets are both negative, thus பX
כ
ப୮
൐ 0; A higher probability of 
detection will lead to a higher reported income, the prediction accords to common 
intuition that higher risk will terrify taxpayers and deter illegal tax manipulations. 
 
The probability of being detected, p, as representing effectiveness of tax administrations 
and quality of legal system, despite relatively constant within a given country, could be 
reasonably assumed as a function of certain factors, such as firm characteristics, which 
will be further discussed in hypothesis 2.   
 
3.2.5. Relevant Discussions 
One important amendment to the previous A-S model is suggested by Yitzhaki (1974), 
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who claims tax rates become neutral if fines are exposed on the evaded amount, not on 
the under-reported income. The amended utility function will be: 
EሺUሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ pሻUሺΠ െ tXሻ ൅ pUሾΠ െ tX െ αtሺΠ െ Xሻሿ      (20) 
In this case, one dollar of tax evasion will generate expected utility as:  
EሺUሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ pሻt െ ptα                      (21) 
And the marginal utility of net income in audited world to the marginal utility in 
unaudited world will be independent of tax rate t as:  
MUሺW౗ሻ
MUሺW౫ሻ
ൌ ଵି୮
୮α
                           (22) 
As equation (15) shows, the original A-S model presents positive income effect (with 
assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion) and negative substitution effect.  
However the substitution effect disappears when penalty is composed on the evaded tax, 
leaving only a positive income effect, and therefore it seems that higher tax rates 
encourage more truthful tax reporting behaviors. This leads to a conclusion that 
contradicts most people’s intuition about the relation between tax rate and evasion, and 
contrary to much empirical evidence, as Sandmo (2005) also pointed. For instance, 
Clotfelter (1983) found strong positive association between marginal tax rates and 
evasion amount. This paper avoids the contradiction by the increasing absolute risk 
aversion assumed, as income effect of tax rate would be negative, thus the 
disappearance of substitution effect does not change the direction of tax rate’s effect on 
evasion incentive, which accords to common intuition and much empirical evidence.  
 
However, even by the unambiguous effect of tax rates in this paper, policy implications 
are not clear-cut on this issue. Tax authorities can not always expect higher levels of tax 
evasion in presence of high tax rates, as situations are oftentimes complicated when 
different firms face various marginal tax rates, or firms in certain areas receive tax 
subsidies or favorable tax policies, thus making the predictions ambiguous.  
 
And possibly, as the evasion amount/percentage goes up, the probability of being caught, 
which is an increasing function of evasion, also rises. Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2000) 
presented this possibility and showed evasion will be constrained by the fact that 
detection probability increases to offset the benefit from hiding. One reason for this 
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could be that the reported tax accounts appear more dubious to tax authorities or 
external auditors, arguably for mostly bigger firms, as small firms lack enough 
disclosure of information and are more effort-taking to investigate.  
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Chapter Four: Hypotheses Development 
4. Hypotheses Development 
Base on the simply model above, I develop the following hypotheses. 
 
4.1. Wealth Effect:  
4.1.1. The effect of Competition 
Hypothesis 1A:  
As competition grows more intense, firm’s tax evasion incentives are strengthening, 
however the effect is at a decreasing rate. 
 
It corresponds to common intuition that when firms have more profits and are less 
constrained by financial circumstances, firms may evade less tax as they probably do 
not need to undertake the risk. As equation (12) shows, the optimal reported fraction 
increases with profit (Π), which corresponds to the previous guess that increasing profit 
reduce tax evasion.  
 
Further, the prevalent assumption of diminishing returns of income in utility functions, 
is also the case in this paper, where a quadratic utility function with the form UሺWሻ ൌ
aW െ bWଶ  has such property 19  as U’’(W)= -2b. As suggested by the law of 
diminishing marginal returns, it is reasonable to further explore the marginal effect of 
profit on its incentive to evade taxes, as equation (13) shows. With 
பሺX
כ
Π
ሻ
பΠ
൐ 0 and 
பమሺX
כ
Π
ሻ
பΠమ
൏ 0, profit displays a decreasing positive effect on evasion incentives.  
 
As market competition grows fiercer, total profits for all firms fall. This paper does not 
assume any specific market structure, but adopts a reasonable assumption that a firm’s 
profit Πis a decreasing function of the competition degree in its product market, as 
பΠ
பሺୡ୭୫୮ୣ୧୲୧୭୬ሻ
൏ 0 . As competition grows fiercer, not only profit margins fall and 
corporate incomes shrink, but the benefits derive from tax evasion also gradually lose 
                                                              
19  And of course, in order to guarantee U’(W)=a‐2bW>0, a/2b needs to be larger than W. 
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its attractiveness as marginal utility from illegally retained tax is declining. 
 
With the previously explained equation (12) and (13), by the positive sign of 
பሺX
כ
Π
ሻ
பΠ
 and 
negative sign of 
பమX
כ
Π
பΠమ
, optimal declared income fraction X
כ
ஈ
 displays a decreasing effect: 
When Π increases, optimal declared fraction X
כ
ஈ
 increases at a declining rate (as with a 
concave shape). As corporate profit Π is a decreasing function of competition, and as 
evasion ratio 
பሺଵିX
כ
Π
ሻ
பΠ
 is of the opposite sign as that of 
பሺX
כ
Π
ሻ
பΠ
, evasion fraction is thus 
exhibiting a decreasing effect with respect to competition. More specifically, the 
decreasing positive effect holds as long as utility function has increasing absolute risk 
aversion and decreasing risk aversion. The form of quadratic utility used in this paper is 
one of many possibilities that satisfy the requirements.   
 
This paper uses the measurement of competition and its square term to capture the effect 
of the negative second derivative as well as the diminishing marginal effect. The 
practice of putting an explanatory variable and its square term dated back from the 
influential work of Mincer (1974), where experience and the square of it are put into 
wage determination equation, and similar results are found that experience has a 
diminishing effect on wage. This paper also adopts the method to use an explanatory 
variables and its square term to capture the diminishing contribution of one determinant, 
which is competition in this paper’s context.  
 
However, evasion amount பX
כ
பΠ
൐ 0  and ப
మXכ
பΠమ
ൌ 0 , so there exists only a positive 
relationship between wealth and optimal declared amount. As mentioned before, 
evasion amount alone is not comprehensive in judging the seriousness of evasion 
behaviors, especially for firms of different size and profitability. The evasion ratio is of 
more emphasis in this paper, and also the key examined part in empirical section later 
on, which echoes the hypothesis 1.   
 
4.1.2. The Effect of Business Constraints 
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Hypothesis 1B:  
Higher levels of business obstacles induce higher level of tax evasion. 
 
High business barriers on one hand, as sunk cost accounted when firms enter the market, 
pushes firms to seek for more profits to compensate these costs, which might turn into 
informal tax practices; And on the other hand inhibit normal business operations and 
growth, drag down the profits horizon, which further encourages the evasion of tax. As 
the positive sign of 
பሺX
כ
ಀ
ሻ
பஈ
 suggested, higher levels of business obstacles reduce Π, 
therefore enhance evasion incentives. These effects from business barriers serve in the 
same direction on evasion incentives as competition does, however probably smaller in 
magnitude.  
 
Cai, Liu and Xiao (2007) hypothesized firm’s evasion incentives are negatively 
correlated with its accessibility to capital market, and empirically tested that financing 
constraint (as one of many market positions influencing profit reporting behaviors), is 
significantly reinforcing evasion incentives. Dabla-Norris et al. (2007, 2008) also 
empirically found general constraints such as financing, corruption, taxes and 
regulations render firms hide more sales; Business constraints such as access to 
financing, tax rates, crime, unfair practices also play the similar role in encouraging 
higher level of evasion in their findings.  
 
Main business obstacles tested in this paper include: tax rate, tax administration, 
corruption, and unfair practices. These obstacles function in a similar way as the 
competition does in the first hypothesis, in a direction that restrains firm's growth as 
well as profits. The differential in magnitude of these effects can be presumed smaller 
than that of competition, since the latter is usually the key determination of firm’s profit 
functions, as firms generally will evolve and adjust according to its competition status 
in relevant market. It can be seen in empirical results that competition and its square 
term have a much larger role as well as marginal effects than other business obstacles. 
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Aureo and Scheinkman (2007) prove theoretically that the informality of a firm is 
correlated to that of firms from which it buys or sells. This point is tested in this paper 
by examining whether financing channels affect tax evasion levels, which is illustrated 
in later context.  
 
Although compared to normal banking-financing, the average informal-channel 
financing level is quite low in the coverage of data in this paper, it displays a strong 
positive relationship with the tax evasion levels for surveyed firms. With informal, 
sometimes private or underground sources of fund, it's often much easier to fake 
financial figures and make up numbers for its cost, which renders evasion of tax quite 
easy to implement. However endogeneity issue also arises here, since it could be 
reasonable argued that firms may seek informal financing from the starting point of 
trying to evade taxes. Firms may decide to evade taxes at the beginning, and then figure 
out several ways to achieve the goal, and sometimes arrive at a solution called informal 
financing, which will be discussed in later context. 
 
4.2. Effect of Firm Characteristics  
Hypothesis 2:  
Firm characteristics such as size, age, audit condition, influence tax evasion incentives.  
 
As the positive sign of பX
כ
ப୮
 in equation (18) implies, higher detection probability 
renders a higher amount of income reported, therefore deters tax evasion. Firm 
characteristics significantly influence detection probability as these characteristics alter 
exposures to tax authorities, or render firms seem dubious in many ways.  
 
Firm size for instance, is a significant determinant of tax evasion. As more often 
exposed to the supervision of the public and tax authorities, bigger firms relatively have 
higher probability of being detected of tax manipulations, if any. Therefore, bigger firms 
tend to evade less, ceteris paribus. Dabla-Norris et al. (2007, 2008) use dummies of 
small and big firms and find significant size effect, that small firms display higher 
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evasion levels while big firms display negative tendency. This paper also tries different 
measures of size, either by 3 or 5-level size classifications, or by the number of 
employees, in both cases the empirical results, as shown later on, correspond to the 
hypothesis that bigger firms evade less tax.  
 
Firm age, as another determinant for evasion incentives, interact with detection 
probability in the same direction as size. The longer the firm has been operating on the 
market, the more reputation it has earned over years of service, and it might be more 
difficult for long-established firms to manipulate on tax, since the loss of loyalty and 
reputation is more severe for these firms and managers. Besides, compared to newly 
registered firms, tax authorities probably have been more familiar with the financial 
situation and performance of long-established ones, which makes detection probability 
higher, and tax evasion more difficult to operate for these firms. 
 
Having an external auditor also greatly increases the probability of being detected of tax 
manipulations, especially when firms are publicly listed. As ethnical codes and 
professionalism require integrity, objectivity and independence of external audits, and as 
maintaining a good reputation is considered to be the single most important ethical 
principle for external auditors, firms with external auditors have a much higher 
probability of detection if tax evasion is committed. Thus the higher risk associated with 
being exposed deters evasion activities. 
 
Ownership and legal status also matter. Compared to domestic firms, foreign firms in 
many countries are constantly supervised or regulated, and are more often the focus of 
public attention. Plus the fact that many foreign firms are in the form of subsidiaries or 
branches of successful MNCs, which usually have well-performing records and 
considerable profits, which make themselves important tax revenue generators. 
Therefore, it’s generally riskier for foreign firms to evade taxes as they face higher 
detection probability, therefore rendering these firms evade less. Besides the general 
classification of domestic and foreign firms, legal status also displays different effects 
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on evasion levels. Public listed companies appear with the lowest level of evasion, 
followed by partnership and private-held limited companies, while sole proprietorship 
appears with the highest evasion levels, which accords to common sense that publicly 
traded companies are under pressure and supervision from many sources, while sole 
proprietorship might be the least supervised and investigated form of legal status.  
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Chapter Five: Data and Empirical Results 
5. Data and Empirical Results 
5.1. Data Description 
This paper mainly employs data from Productivity and the Investment Climate Private 
Enterprise Survey, which is carried out by the World Bank, covering 72 countries and 
regions, 48261 surveyed firms during 2002 to 2005. Other sources such as World 
Governance Indicators, “DoingBusiness” dataset supplements the empirical findings.   
 
Productivity and the Investment Climate Private Enterprise Survey (PICPE thereafter), 
which a comprehensive survey regarding various business climate, is carried out by the 
World Bank. “The Surveys use standardized survey instruments and a uniform sampling 
methodology to minimize measurement error and to yield data that are comparable 
across the world’s economies. The use of properly designed survey instruments and a 
uniform sampling methodology enhances the credibility of World Bank analysis and the 
recommendations that stem from this analysis. The sampling methodology of the World 
Bank’s Enterprise Survey generates samples sizes appropriate to achieve two main 
objectives: First, to benchmark the investment climate of individual economies across 
the world and, Second, to conduct firm performance analyses focusing on determining 
how investment climate constraints affect productivity and job creation in selected 
sectors.”20 
 
5.2. Key Variables 
This paper draws the measurement of tax evasion (the dependent variable21), which is 
the estimated percentage of total sales kept off for tax purposes, from one of the survey 
questions: “Recognizing the difficulties many enterprises face in fully complying with 
taxes and regulations, what percentage of total sales would you estimate the typical 
establishment in your area of activity reports for tax purposes?” 
 
                                                              
20  See the Implementation Note for PICPE from World Bank, February 2007. 
21  See the appendix, Table 11 for detailed variable definitions and sources. 
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Arguably, the survey question used to measure tax evasion raises some concerns, as the 
questionnaire asks for a typical firm’s tax reporting behavior in the respondent’s 
industry, but not directly for the surveyed firm itself. However, since tax noncompliance 
(especially illegal tax evasion) is highly confidential and crucial information that could 
not be easily retrieved from outside the firm, surveyed managers (together with chief 
financial officer and chief executive) presumably respond according to their own 
experiences, and the responses could be reasonably interpreted as truly indicating the 
firm’s own behavior. Previous empirical work utilizing similar data sources also 
acknowledges this issue and proceeds in the same way with caution, as in Dabla-Norris 
et al. (2008). This paper also regards this measure as a proper proxy for tax evasion in 
firm’s reporting behaviors.  
 
Although previous theoretical predictions suggests both evasion amount and percentage 
will increase when competition increase (firm income decline therefore), this paper only 
tests the evasion percentage empirically. The measurement of actual evasion amount 
fails to provide convincing cross-country comparisons as the amounts are listed in local 
currencies and purchasing powers differ across countries.  
 
One determinant of tax evasion that needs most attention is the unique measurement of 
competition, which can serve largely as product substitutability. The measure comes 
from one survey question: "If you were to raise your prices of your main product line or 
main line of services 10 percent above the current level in the domestic market (after 
allowing for any inflation), assuming your competitors maintained their current prices, 
how would your customers react?" Firms were asked to select from four indexes below:  
 
1: Continue to buy from us in same quantities as now;  
2: Continue to buy at slightly lower quantities;   
3: Continue to buy at much lower quantities;   
4: Stop buying.  
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Therefore, large values of the measurement mean more competition. This unique 
measure of competition absorbs information regarding the surveyed firm's competitive 
status in its relevant market. Compared to other measures such as the number of 
competitors, the latter suffers from lack of assumption of the market structure and 
competition degree. For instance, a monopoly which takes up nearly all domestic 
market, leaving only narrow survival space for small local competitors, would not 
experience significant decline in sales if it raises price within acceptable range with 
inelastic demand. Other utilized measures of market share such as HHI index and CR-N 
ratio, nevertheless also fail to provide comprehensive information about price elasticity 
or product substitutability of competing firms. If products are geographically isolated or 
consumers are mostly very brand-loyal and price insensitive, raising price of products 
will not be encountered with significant sales decline. In circumstances similar to those 
listed above, the measures of competition fail to provide insightful information about 
competition, and firms do not fear the competition pressure, therefore their incentives to 
evade taxes as an alternative to gain competition advantage are reduced.  
 
The main measurement of competition22 employed by this paper, although not perfect, 
is nevertheless a unique measure and provides some insights, as it serves the same 
function as price elasticity or product substitutability. Another possible measurement of 
competition is the number of competitors faced by individual firm in its product market, 
supposing that increasing number of competitors would enhance competition, and 
through some underlying way, enhance firms' incentives to hide profit for tax purpose, 
in order to gain a relatively advantageous position in market. However in many 
real-world cases, the number of competitors often fails to describe the market structure 
and cannot provide insightful information about firm's competition status. For instance, 
there could be numerous small businesses providing daily groceries in each 
neighborhood, meanwhile there exists national chain-store supermarkets monopolizing 
whole domestic market and owns overwhelming market shares. In such case increasing 
the number of small local firms does not affect the sales of the monopoly and does very 
                                                              
22  See Appendix II for its detailed definition. 
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little effect on the market.  
 
It is also argued that the relationship between concentration and competition is 
ambiguous. For instance, fierce competition may not exist if firms in highly 
concentrated market collude and manipulate prices; Competition may also be very 
intense in low-concentrated market, where innumerous firms compete on zero profit and 
in perfect competition. Prior empirical approaches mainly use market concentration as 
sole measures for competition. For instance, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI 
thereafter) and four-firm concentration ratio (CR-4 ratio), which suffer the weakness to 
describe the actual market structure and competition degree, although much prior 
research has used a single measure of concentration as measurement of competition, 
(e.g., Harris, 1998; Engel et al., 2003). These studies inherently assume that market 
structure is exogenous, that prices decline as concentration falls, and thus that lower 
concentration reflects higher competition. However, endogenous market structure 
indicates ambiguous directions from concentration to competition, especially in 
cross-industry studies (e.g., Demsetz, 1973; Aghion et al., 2001; Raith, 2003). HHI 
index for instance, is more sensitive to the shares of big firms in the market, but 
insensitive to shares of smaller firms, which could be the majority in the market. 
Besides, HHI index requires accurate market shares information of all firms (or at least 
the biggest 50 firms) in a given relevant market, which remains unfeasible for many 
cross-country studies. Also, as a possible weakness of this paper, obtaining accurate 
cross-country data on concentration information in the surveyed industries is difficult to 
implement, as the names of surveyed firms and respondent are treated strictly 
anonymously and confidentially, unless the World Bank do this survey again asking 
respondents about their market shares, which also could be unreliable if SMEs are the 
majority in surveyed markets. 
 
Measurements of business constraint come from survey questions asking whether the 
following issues are a problem for the operation and growth of the surveyed business. 
The severity as an obstacle is based on a four-point scale where 0= No obstacle, 
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1=Minor obstacle, 2=Moderate obstacles, 3=Major obstacle, 4=Very sever obstacle.  
Higher values of the measures mean higher levels of business constraints. Selected 
business constraints include tax rates, tax administration, corruption, unfair practices, 
etc.  
 
5.3. General Picture of Summary Statistics and Categories 
Other determinants for tax evasion are mainly categorized as following:  
 
• Competition measures such as "competition". 
• Firm-specific characteristics, including age, size, sector, industry, business and 
financing constraints. 
• Country level controls, including number of starting procedures for a typical business, 
closing recovery rate of initial capital, quality of legal system, etc.  
 
The following figures provide an overlook about evasion levels and evasion levels by 
various classifications respectively.  
 
Figure 1: Distribution of dependent variable: tax evasion percentage 
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Figure 2: Average evasion levels for firms of different size  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Average evasion levels for firms of different sectors  
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Figure 4: Average evasion levels for different industries 
 
 
Figure 5: Average evasion levels for different ownership  
 
 
As seen from the figures above, different sectors, industries and ownerships display 
divergent levels for tax evasion. For instance, agricultural industry is in the highest 
category, while telecommunications is at the lowest. It may accords to commonly 
observed features of these industries. For example, in heavily regulated and supervised 
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industries such as broadcasting and telecommunications, evasion of tax is difficult to 
implement and highly risky; And in industries such as Mining and quarrying, output and 
prices are easily observable and could hardly be faked, which also reduces the chance 
for tax evasion.  
 
In the following Table 2, summary statistics are presented for a general picture of the 
variables pool. Definition and sources of these variables are presented in the appendix.  
   
Table 2: Percentage of sales not reported to tax authorities 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Dependent Variable: 
evasion  22261  16.688    25.073    0  100 
Competition Measures: 
competition  22261  2.635    1.082    1  4 
Business and Financing constraints: 
business constraint: tax rate  22261  1.806    1.247    0  4 
business constraint: tax admin  22261  1.546    1.234    0  4 
business constraint: corruption  22261  1.381    1.374    0  4 
business constraint: access finance  22261  1.394    1.284    0  4 
business constraint: unfair practices  22261  1.412    1.265    0  4 
informal financing  15787  0.956    6.559    0  100 
bank financing  15892  13.462    23.857    0  100 
Firm Characteristics: 
audit  22261  0.479    0.500    0  1 
log(age)  22261  2.435    0.812    0  5.308   
size  22261  2.297    1.310    1  5 
foreign  22261  0.123    0.328    0  1 
manufacture  22261  0.461    0.498    0  1 
service  22261  0.427    0.495    0  1 
agriculture  22261  0.012    0.111    0  1 
Country level factors: 
start procedures  21222  10.756    3.271    4  17 
voice & accountability  22261  0.133    0.896    ‐1.809    1.644   
political stability  22261  ‐0.084    0.794    ‐2.033    1.170   
rule of law  22261  ‐0.101    0.837    ‐1.418    1.738   
regulation quality  22261  0.161    0.792    ‐1.732    1.593   
government efficiency  22261  0.082    0.767    ‐1.210    1.643   
corruption  22261  ‐0.088    0.824    ‐1.172    1.922   
highest marginal tax rate  18667  25.340    5.781    10  35 
tax/profit ratio  21539  53.964    24.735    19.4  186.1 
Informal economy  19890  34.3201  12.34056  15.6  67.3 
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Competition's effect on tax evasion could be the most important factor as directly 
influencing profits and sales, determines firm’s evasion level. For other business 
obstacles like tax administrations or corruption, which might be less important in 
determining a firm’s profitability than competition does, effects of these factors on 
evasion incentives could be reasonably minor compared to competition. 
 
The following table shows the summary of evasion level classified by each degree of 
competition and business constraints, respectively. 
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  Table 3: Summarized Evasion levels for different business obstacles 
Customer reaction if price increased by 10% 
 Mean  Std.Dev  Min Max  No. of obs 
buy same quantities  14.577 24.387 0 100 4019 
slightly lower quantities  17.258 25.300 0 100 6531 
much lower quantities  18.617 25.995 0 100 5271 
stop buying  15.849  24.353  0  100  6440 
Business constraint: tax rates 
 Mean  Std.Dev  Min Max  No. of obs 
No obstacle  13.882 25.776 0 100 4899 
Minor obstacle  13.514 22.873 0 100 3809 
Moderate obstacle  16.189 24.275 0 100 5642 
Major obstacle  17.532 24.107 0 100 6531 
Very Severe Obstacle  33.456  28.966  0  100  1380 
Business constraint: tax administration 
 Mean  Std.Dev  Min Max  No. of obs 
No obstacle  13.965 25.491 0 100 6341 
Minor obstacle  14.179 22.663 0 100 4365 
Moderate obstacle  16.941 24.422 0 100 5516 
Major obstacle  18.683 24.702 0 100 5133 
Very Severe Obstacle  34.990  29.969  0  100  906 
Business constraint: corruption 
 Mean  Std.Dev  Min Max  No. of obs 
No obstacle  11.349 22.233 0 100 8751 
Minor obstacle  14.842 22.843 0 100 3990 
Moderate obstacle  18.023 24.365 0 100 3709 
Major obstacle  21.508 26.890 0 100 3899 
Very Severe Obstacle  32.558  30.047  0  100  1912 
Business constraint: unfairl practices 
 Mean  Std.Dev  Min Max  No. of obs 
No obstacle  13.721 24.779 0 100 7484 
Minor obstacle  14.913 23.347 0 100 4613 
Moderate obstacle  16.216 23.568 0 100 4816 
Major obstacle  19.518 25.221 0 100 4204 
Very Severe Obstacle  34.846  30.233  0  100  1144 
Business constraint: access to finance 
 Mean  Std.Dev  Min Max  No. of obs 
No obstacle  14.148 24.245 0 100 7923 
Minor obstacle  14.367 23.292 0 100 4203 
Moderate obstacle  16.377 23.842 0 100 4782 
Major obstacle  18.978 25.485 0 100 4151 
Very Severe Obstacle  34.877  30.949  0  100  1202 
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In the first panel in the table above, as competition grow fiercer (as customer reactions 
grow more violate), related evasion levels experience first an increase, from 14.6% to 
17.2%, reaches the highest point 18.6% when corresponding category is “buy much 
lower quantities”, then to 15.8% when customer stop buying. The trend of tax evasion 
levels displays a decreasing effect if summarized levels, and will be examined 
controlling for other effects as shown in later context.  
 
For the rest three business obstacles, evasion levels rise monotonously with higher 
levels of obstacle levels, from around 13% of no obstacle, rise until over 30% when 
obstacle is very severe. These business obstacles, although also playing roles in shaping 
the profitability of individual firms, are not the crucial determinants for their 
competitiveness and tax evasion decisions as competition does, as following regressions 
indicate. 
 
5.4. Empirical Results and Interpretations 
Tobit estimation is applied for Maximum Likelihood Estimation, since many 
observations are left-censored according to the fact that a majority of firms reported that 
they evade zero tax. Also, tax evasion as a percentage of the total sales is also naturally 
right-censored at one hundred. In previous empirical work, for instance Dabla-Norris et. 
al (2007, 2008) used ordered probit model, which is essential the same MLE estimation 
method, except for the fact that tobit model better captures and estimates the survey data 
which is censored at both ends. Empirical results are reported with standard errors in 
parentheses.   
 
As listed below, different business obstacles facing firms are individually tested, and are 
jointly tested and remain significant in the main estimation (the sixth column). Each 
individual estimation model is statistically significant, and the fifth model is more so, 
with larger pseudo R-square23. Different specifications of models are also tried, for 
                                                              
23  The  standard  pseudo  R‐square  calculated  in  the  above  regressions  are  McFadden's  pseudo  R‐square,  by 
calculating the R‐square between predicted and observed values, the 5th model has a pseudo R‐square of 0.1087, 
which is of better fit, and much closer to 0.1116 from OLS regression. 
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instance if column (1) through (5) are estimated in probit model, the coefficients for 
determinants display the same directions of effects and comparable in magnitudes to 
tobit coefficients adjusted by the estimated sigma (variance).  
 
Table 4: Determinants of Tax Evasion: Percentage of Total Sales Evaded 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
competition  13.88***  15.62***  15.50***  14.06***  15.64***  13.14*** 
(1.767)  (1.767)  (1.766)  (1.753)  (1.768)  (1.752) 
competition^2  ‐2.591***  ‐2.884***  ‐2.844***  ‐2.629***  ‐2.867***  ‐2.507*** 
(0.334)  (0.335)  (0.335)  (0.332)  (0.335)  (0.332) 
Firm characteristics: 
audit  ‐6.844***  ‐6.361***  ‐6.286***  ‐6.211***  ‐6.199***  ‐6.011*** 
(0.702)  (0.703)  (0.703)  (0.697)  (0.705)  (0.697) 
log(age)  ‐2.931***  ‐2.807***  ‐2.630***  ‐2.757***  ‐2.721***  ‐2.754*** 
(0.441)  (0.441)  (0.441)  (0.438)  (0.441)  (0.437) 
size  ‐4.120***  ‐4.263***  ‐4.385***  ‐4.122***  ‐4.132***  ‐4.101*** 
(0.303)  (0.303)  (0.303)  (0.301)  (0.304)  (0.301) 
foreign  ‐5.780***  ‐6.100***  ‐6.375***  ‐6.256***  ‐5.363***  ‐5.702*** 
(1.080)  (1.082)  (1.081)  (1.073)  (1.084)  (1.074) 
Business constraints: 
unfair practices  4.876***  1.756*** 
(0.262)  (0.297) 
tax rate    4.329***  0.592   
(0.268)  (0.369) 
tax administration  4.507***  1.431*** 
(0.267)  (0.363) 
corruption  6.539***  4.750*** 
(0.253)  (0.297) 
access to finance  3.640***  1.123*** 
(0.260)  (0.280) 
industry  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
rule of law  ‐6.698***  ‐7.117***  ‐6.866***  ‐4.460***  ‐6.970***  ‐4.820*** 
(0.432)  (0.432)  (0.432)  (0.442)  (0.433)  (0.442) 
constant  20.180    20.76*  21.77*  18.420    19.370    16.170   
(12.280)  (12.280)  (12.260)  (12.200)  (12.280)  (12.150) 
Observations  22261    22261    22261    22261    22261    22261   
 
5.4.1. Significant Effect of Competition 
As "competition" and its squared term (first two rows in the above table) indicate, as the 
degree of competition grows, associated tax evasion levels experience increases at 
decreasing speed. Naturally, it would be best if the question regarding be designed into 
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how much percentage would the surveyed firm's sales be affected if main product raises 
price by 1%. However due to the design of the questionnaire for easy-responding, the 
four-scale measure is the only available source for the elasticity of demand (or as 
product substitutivity).  
 
More specifically, from estimation(1) through (6) in Table 4, competition and its square 
term together show significant effect on evasion levels, with the coefficients of 
“competition” ranging from 13.14 to 15.64, and the square term from -2.507 to -2.884.  
 
5.4.2. Important Firm-specific Characteristics 
Firm size, either categorized into four levels (from 1 for micro firms to 4 for large 
firms), or measured by the natural log of the number of employees, displays opposite 
direction with tax evasion. This accords to most people’s sense that bigger firms tends 
to be more formal, while small firms are more likely to have tax manipulations. Firm 
size could also be proxied by its asset value or sales, however the survey has such data 
only in terms of local currencies, which makes comparisons less reliable. It is also 
argued that in sense of business morality, number of employees is more binding than 
asset value to managers (e.g. High-tech companies might have few employees but huge 
asset value); As employers develop nice work relationships and emotional connections 
with employees, managers might not be willing to sacrifice employee’s jobs or confront 
moral remorse.  
 
Whether the firm has an external auditor makes big differences. Captured by the dummy 
variable "audit", which equals 1 if the surveyed firm has an external auditor (and 0 
otherwise), significantly reduce the evasion levels. This could be explained under the 
previous context that, being exposed to auditors and public supervision, the probability 
of being caught and get punished increases, thus reducing the evasion incentives. For 
instance, Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in U.S routinely examines a high percentage of 
large companies, while for medium-sized corporations only operational audits are 
performed. Also, firms usually need external auditors to provide credibility for their 
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financial reports and accounting operations, oftentimes for IPOs, or annual routines for 
listed companies. For companies seeking to guarantee their shareholders secured returns, 
the punishment and reputation loss associated with high detection probability will deter 
tax evasions.   
 
Ownership structure also affects tax evasion behaviors. For instance, foreign firms 
significantly evade less than domestic ones. This result corresponds to real-life 
observations that foreign firms are usually more formal in operations and management 
compared to local firms, and foreign firms are usually exposed to more supervision 
power like media, local government and tax authorities, thus their possibility of being 
detected for of incompliance is relatively higher, therefore discourage the evasion 
incentives for foreign firms. It’s also a common phenomenon that foreign branches or 
subsidiaries usually belong to formally-regulated and listed companies overseas, again 
for similar reasons like audited firms, foreign firms generally evade less.  
 
Different industries display diverse evasion levels. In the survey, industries are 
classified into categories in which the firm is mainly operating in. There are 29 
classifications in the survey, such as Food, Metals and machinery, Retail and wholesale 
trade, etc. After partially out identified determinants for tax evasion and controlled for 
industry clustering effects, different industries still display significant effects. The 
nature and practice of a certain industry oftentimes determine largely firm’s behaviors. 
For instance, firms in mining industry face easily observed output and prices, therefore 
their sales are relatively more difficult to hide; In contrary, firms providing services are 
much easier to fake financial figures as their output is hard to trace. These effects can 
also be seen from a rougher classification of sector, including Manufacture, Agriculture, 
Construction, Service and others. Agricultural firms generally have the highest level of 
tax evasion: 31.35% kept off sales. Manufacturing comes second with 19.67%, 
construction and Service firms similarly at 14.53%. The large effect indicated by 
Agriculture sector is not quite surprising, given the high level of evasion in that industry 
(either sheltering or the nature of that industry) and around 300 agricultural firms in our 
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data, and sector dummies remain significant after partially out other determinants.   
 
5.4.3. Financing and Other Business Constraints 
Generally, firms facing more severe business constraints evade more tax, as corporate 
income (or profit margin, ROE, etc), is constrained by these obstacles.  
 
Unfair practices measures how unfair practices are an obstacle to the surveyed firm. 
Higher values of this variable means firms face higher constraints in competition, which 
inhibit normal business growth. The unfair practices by government or other 
competitors therefore serve as stimulus for tax evasion. Also, it's often argued that 
nonmonetary factors play considerable roles in tax reporting behaviors, for instance the 
perception of a fair treatment. Firms those perceive themselves as being unfairly treated 
in competition and hurt by other's mal-practices, might seek alternative measures to 
make up the disadvantage, for instance evasion of tax.  
 
Empirical results show this variable has the same direction of effect that encourages tax 
evasion as competition does.  
 
 
Tax rate as a business obstacle, also inhibits firm's operation and growth and encourage 
evasion incentives. The measurement is coded as 0 if tax rates is not a problem for the 
surveyed firm, and then from 1 of minor obstacle until 4 of very severe obstacle. Note al 
these obstacles are measured conceptually, therefore higher tax rate as business obstacle 
does not necessarily mean higher tax rates. As firms facing diverse tax rates, and the 
same rate levels impose lighter or heavier burdens for different firms.  
 
Tax administration, also one business obstacle for firm's growth and profitability, was 
under the same category with tax rates and following corruption, unfair practices, also 
coded on a same 0-through-4 scale. And from the same expectation and reasoning, it 
displayed positive effects towards tax evasion levels, comparable to the effects of tax 
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rates.  
 
Regarding the effect of corruption on official economy, there are mainly two different 
views: One is represented by Paul Romer suggesting corruption as a tax on ex-post 
profits, may stimulate entry of new goods or technology requiring initial fixed 
investment. Significant negative correlation between corruption and GDP growth rate 
has been found by Paolo Mauro (1995) and Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton 
(1998); Another viewpoint which emphasis on corruption’s substitutive effect, is 
represented by Bardhan (1997), who claims the progress of economic growth will 
ultimately generates enough forces to reduce corruption. Empirical work investigating 
the relationship between corruption and shadow economy has presented strong and 
consistent relationship that countries with more corruption have higher share of shadow 
economy, as Johnson et. al (1998) showed. As more corruption is associated with larger 
informal economy, it also reduces the expected payoff from formal economy, firms 
might need to compensate through unlawful means such as evasion of tax, for reasons 
stated above for other business constraints.  
 
Previous mentioned business obstacles are smaller in magnitude, compared to those of 
competition, and it could be reasonable argued these business obstacles are not the key 
determinants in market competition, while the product substitutivity (e.g., brand loyalty) 
and competition could be the main battlefield, that shape the structure and profitability 
of the market.  
 
Each business obstacle is tested, both separately and jointly significant in our 
specification, as shown in the regression table.   
 
Notably, firms financing more from informal sources evade more, compared to those 
relying more on commercial banks. This could be explained by supervising power, 
formality of firm's running, easiness to fake accounting figures, etc. See in next page the 
effects of informal financing, compared to bank financing. Most firms in the survey 
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reply on formal financing sources such as banks, state services or formal financial 
corporations, and the few firms financing from informal sources (such as money-lenders) 
significantly evade more tax. However, this interesting result suffers from endogenous 
issues, as the possibility that firms seek informal financing on the start on tax evasion 
considerations cannot be removed. And the limited observations of firms with informal 
financing could not justify the instrument variables approach to eliminate the 
endogeneity problem.   
 
5.4.4. Other Potential Determinants: 
In the empirical results, a wide selection of possible determinants of tax evasion are 
tried and presented, as this paper try not to be constrained by determinants provided and 
acknowledged in the survey, and provide more general insights.  
 
As the most observable factor, which may directly comes into most people’s minds, that 
the actual tax rates might be of great importance to tax evasion. It is very natural to 
assume that when tax rates are too high or unbearable, firms may take measures to 
reduce or avoid tax burdens. In the survey, tax rates were asked on conceptual basis that 
whether tax rates are a business obstacle for the surveyed firm. It could be the case that 
actual tax rates also serve as a determinant for evasion activities, and therefore the true 
tax rate is also incorporated in empirical test. This paper uses marginal highest corporate 
income tax rates in the following table, first by testing it alone, then adding other 
business obstacles into regressions.  
 
From the table below, column (1) shows that when testing alone, marginal tax rate 
seems to be negatively (which has the smallest determining power on evasion, 
compared to other determinants) related to evasion levels. However after adding other 
business obstacles, the effect of actual tax rates turns positively related to tax rate (same 
direction as most people would predict) as indicated in the column (2), however the 
effect ceases to be significant. The result is understandable, since the tax rate as a 
business obstacle has probably already absorbed the effects of actual tax rate. Further, 
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actual tax rates impose different tax burdens to firms of divergent performances and 
market status. A high tax rate might be pushing a small firm to the edge of closure, but 
might be only a light burden for long-established successful businesses.  
 
Another controversial issue is whether the shadow economy within a country affects 
individual firm’s decision to evade tax. It could be argued that shadow economy is 
another sector with different rules that rarely correlates with most formal firms, 
especially large and profitable ones; Different voices are also heard claiming the 
economy is a dynamic entity and will respond to changes on macro levels. The size of 
shadow economy would signal the benefits from the side and induce formal firms to act 
accordingly. This paper therefore employs the ratio of informal output to GDP to test its 
effect on firm’s evasion activities, as some marginal firms may choose between going 
underground or register formally based on expected payoffs from both sides.  
 
In the column (3) of the table below, when shadow economy is added alone with basic 
determinants, it is positively associated with evasion levels. As to the sign of the effect, 
as it is reasonably expected countries with large shadow economies have less efficient 
legal environment, and therefore formal firms would evade more due to lower detection 
probabilities. After adding other business obstacles, the effect becomes negative and 
ceases to be significant. It could be the case that added business obstacles better capture 
unexplained effects in residuals, and make less correlation with previous determinants, 
thus render the effect of shadow economy not significant.  
 
Further, since countries with larger underground economy already suffer from loss of 
tax base, the tax revenues from formally registered firms are more important to 
governments and relatively easier to supervise and collect tax from. Thus governments 
in these countries might put in more efforts on formal firms. However the detection 
probabilities differ for different-sized firms. After specifying the impact of shadow 
economy on firms of different sizes24, column (5) presents a picture that corresponds to 
                                                              
24  Variable  “shadow  economy  for  small  firms”  comes  from multiply  “shadow  rate” with  the dummy variable 
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common sense that smaller firms are more inclined to be affected by the lure from 
shadow economy, as small firms are closer to the edge of deciding whether to operate 
formally or going underground. And a larger ratio of shadow economy reflects the 
situation of many other decision-makers who faced the similar choices and decided to 
go underground, indicating the attractiveness of shadow sector. Smaller firms might 
choose to report less to tax authorities, as they nevertheless are not much supervised or 
often checked. However, bigger firms have higher probability of detection, together 
with strengthened supervision, evasion incentives are deterred. 
   
                                                                                                                                                                                       
“small”, similar for variable “shadow economy for big firms”. 
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Table 5: Determinants of Tax Evasion (with Shadow Economy) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
competition  16.41*** 12.69*** 14.30***  10.85***  10.93*** 
(1.91)  (1.89)  (1.90)  (1.87)  (1.87) 
competition^2  ‐2.967*** ‐2.427*** ‐2.643***  ‐2.169***  ‐2.180*** 
(0.36)  (0.36)  (0.36)  (0.35)  (0.35) 
Firm characteristics: 
audit  ‐7.247*** ‐6.358*** ‐6.755***  ‐5.966***  ‐6.061*** 
(0.76)  (0.75)  (0.75)  (0.74)  (0.74) 
log(age)  ‐2.381*** ‐2.372*** ‐2.009***  ‐1.970***  ‐1.953*** 
(0.48)  (0.47)  (0.47)  (0.47)  (0.47) 
size  ‐4.359*** ‐4.248*** ‐4.194***  ‐4.173***  ‐2.644*** 
(0.33)  (0.32)  (0.32)  (0.32)  (0.54) 
foreign  ‐4.907*** ‐4.088*** ‐5.095***  ‐4.124***  ‐4.112*** 
(1.17)  (1.16)  (1.17)  (1.16)  (1.15) 
Business constraints: 
Unfair practices  2.074*** 2.050***  2.071*** 
(0.32)  (0.32)  (0.32) 
tax rate    0.719*  0.967**  0.881** 
(0.39)  (0.39)  (0.39) 
tax administration  1.430*** 1.525***  1.586*** 
(0.39)  (0.38)  (0.38) 
corruption  3.920*** 3.709***  3.659*** 
(0.32)  (0.32)  (0.32) 
access to finance 1.270*** 1.583***  1.557*** 
(0.30)  (0.30)  (0.30) 
marginal highest tax rate  0.144**  0.168***
(0.06)  (0.06) 
shadow economy  0.0855**  (0.06) 
(0.04)  (0.04) 
shadow economy * small firms  0.0537** 
(0.02) 
shadow economy * big firms  ‐0.115*** 
(0.04) 
industry  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
rule of law  ‐7.910*** ‐5.568*** ‐5.656***  ‐5.099***  ‐4.312*** 
(0.47)  (0.49)  (0.63)  (0.64)  (0.50) 
Constant 12.43    5.47    ‐18.86***  13.29    8.78   
(13.37)  (13.15)  (5.47)  (10.74)  (10.79) 
Observations  18667    18667    17484    17484    17484   
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In the table below, the predicted levels of tax evasion, which is drawn from the main 
regression in column (5) of Table 6, are used for prediction according to competition 
status and various business constraints. For instance in the first row of Panel A, there’s 
2789 firms who is predicted to evade no tax at all, given that their competition situation 
is advantageous (Consumers buy same quantities if the product raised its price by 10%); 
And 877 firms would evade 0 to 20% of total sales given their consumer will buy 
slightly lower quantities if price raised 10%, etc. As competition grows fiercer, more 
firms appear to evade more tax.  
 
In Panel B to E, as business constraints grow more serious, more firms engage in larger 
proportions of tax evasion. The last row of “very severe obstacle” in each of these 
panels shows uniformly the trend that few firms evade no tax and more firms engage in 
the last two columns, which are 40-60% or even more.  
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Table 6: Predicted level of tax evasion from Table 5, column (6) 
Panel A:Customrer reaction if price increases by 10% 
  None 0‐20 20‐40 40‐60 >60  No. of obs. 
same  quantities  2898  913  193  15    0    4019   
slightly  lower  3584  2164  697  83    3    6531   
much  lower  2626  1730  806  101  8    5271   
stop  buying  3912  1916 564  47  1  6440 
Panel B: Tax rates as business constraint
  None 0‐20 20‐40 40‐60 >60  No. of obs. 
No  obstacle  3821  875  185  17    1  4899   
Minor  obstacle  2759  881  155  12    2    3809   
Moderate  obstacle  3393  1830  382  31    6    5642   
Major  obstacle  2917  2712  827  72    3    6531   
Very severe obstacle  130  425  711  114  0  1380 
Panel C: Tax administration as business constraint
  None 0‐20 20‐40 40‐60 >60  No. of obs. 
No  obstacle  4810  1186  319  25    1    6341   
Minor  obstacle  3086  1065  200  12    2    4365   
Moderate  obstacle  3068  1904  497  44    3    5516   
Major  obstacle  1989  2312  756  71    5    5133   
Very severe obstacle  67  256  488  94  1  906 
 
Panel D: Corruption as business 
constraint       
  None 0‐20 20‐40 40‐60 >60  No. of obs. 
No  obstacle  7665  1012  73    1    0  8751   
Minor  obstacle  2775  1116  91    8    0  3990   
Moderate  obstacle  1681  1755  258  15    0  3709   
Major  obstacle  861  2290  703  43    2    3899   
Very severe obstacle  38  550  1135  179  10  1912 
Panel E: Unfair practices as business constraint 
  None 0‐20 20‐40 40‐60 >60  No. of obs. 
No  obstacle  5865  1360  246  13    0  7484   
Minor  obstacle  2986  1365  249  12    1  4613   
Moderate  obstacle  2557  1759  460  40    0    4816   
Major  obstacle  1534  1907  686  70    7    4204   
Very severe obstacle  78  332  619  111  4  1144 
Panel F: Access to finance as business constraint 
  None 0‐20 20‐40 40‐60 >60  No. of obs. 
No  obstacle  5927  1610  364  19    3    7923   
Minor  obstacle  2819  1174  199  8    3    4203   
Moderate  obstacle  2555  1776  417  32    2    4782   
Major  obstacle  1631  1778  666  74    2    4151   
Very severe obstacle  88  385  614  113  2  1202 
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Again from the main regression of Table 6 Colum (6), I estimate the marginal effects for 
determinants of tax evasion as shown in the table below. 
 
 
Table 7: Marginal Effects after Tobit Estimation  
variable  dy/dx  Std.Err. z  P>z  [        95% C.I.      ]  X 
competition  13.144  1.752  7.5 0.000  9.711  16.578  2.635 
competition^2  ‐2.507  0.332  ‐7.56 0.000  ‐3.157  ‐1.857  8.114 
audit*  ‐6.011  0.697  ‐8.62 0.000  ‐7.377  ‐4.645  0.479 
log(age)  ‐2.754  0.437  ‐6.3 0.000  ‐3.611  ‐1.898  2.435 
size  ‐4.101  0.301  ‐13.64 0.000  ‐4.691  ‐3.512  2.297 
foreign*  ‐5.702  1.074  ‐5.31 0.000  ‐7.807  ‐3.598  0.123 
rule of law  ‐4.820  0.442  ‐10.9 0.000  ‐5.687  ‐3.953  ‐0.101 
unfair practices  1.756  0.297  5.91 0.000  1.174  2.338  1.412 
tax rate  0.592  0.369  1.61 0.108  ‐0.130  1.315  1.806 
tax 
administration 
1.431  0.363  3.95 0.000  0.720  2.142  1.546 
corruption  4.750  0.297  16.01 0.000  4.168  5.331  1.381 
access to finance  1.123  0.280  4.01 0.000  0.574  1.672  1.394 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
 
And again, competition and its square term are the most important determinants, as 
would be expected from tobit estimations, with marginal effects significant and large in 
magnitude. The expected signs of marginal effects accord to previous estimation. As 
growing larger and older, firms tend to evade less, dummy variables such as foreign 
ownership and having an external auditor have clear negative impact on tax evasion. 
Industrial effects are omitted for concern of brevity, but available upon interest or 
request.  
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Table 8: Determinants of informality: effects of informal financing 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
competition  20.30***  12.79***  12.79***  12.75*** 
(1.997)  (1.923)  (2.691)  (1.924) 
competition^2  ‐3.612***  ‐2.471***  ‐2.471***  ‐2.459*** 
(0.379)  (0.364)  (0.481)  (0.365) 
audit  ‐7.909***  ‐5.243***  ‐5.243***  ‐5.311*** 
(0.794)  (0.767)  (1.124)  (0.768) 
log(age)  ‐2.595***  ‐2.990***  ‐2.990***  ‐3.038*** 
(0.501)  (0.484)  (0.720)  (0.485) 
size  ‐3.625***  ‐4.118***  ‐4.118***  ‐4.178*** 
(0.332)  (0.328)  (0.480)  (0.330) 
foreign  ‐6.102***  ‐4.205***  ‐4.205**  ‐4.190*** 
(1.201)  (1.159)  (1.778)  (1.160) 
unfair practices  2.182***  2.182***  2.155*** 
(0.330)  (0.267)  (0.330) 
tax rate    1.173***  1.173***  1.161*** 
(0.406)  (0.344)  (0.406) 
tax administration  0.805**  0.805*  0.828** 
(0.401)  (0.429)  (0.401) 
corruption  4.551***  4.551***  4.575*** 
(0.333)  (0.443)  (0.333) 
access to finance  1.115***  1.115***  1.139*** 
(0.310)  (0.306)  (0.310) 
informal financing  0.284***  0.224***  0.224*** 
(0.054)  (0.051)  (0.044) 
bank financing  0.012   
(0.015) 
industry  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
rule of law  ‐10.32***  ‐5.516***  ‐5.516***  ‐5.663*** 
(0.469)  (0.490)  (0.715)  (0.494) 
Constant  ‐6.993***  (5.036)  (5.036)  (4.745) 
(2.612)  (5.219)  (4.692)  (5.222) 
Observations  15787    15787    15787    15787   
 
As seen in the table above, when added one variable “informal financing”25 alone into 
the determination of tax evasion, it appears to be positive associated with evasion 
(column 1), this impact remains significant after other business constraints are added 
(column 2) and controlled for industry clustering effect (Column 3), although only a 
                                                              
25  This is the percentage of contribution from informal sources (e.g. money lender) as financing to the surveyed 
establishment (Including working capital and new investments). 
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very low fraction of surveyed firm have informal financing. However, bank financing 
does not seem to be correlated with tax evasion as shown in column 4. The variable of 
bank financing covers financing sources from local commercial banks (loan, overdraft), 
foreign owned commercial banks, leasing arrangement, investment funds/special 
development financing or other state services. It is a general measure of formal 
financing, as these sources all have some access to firm’s performances and accounting 
records, and have supervision power upon.  
 
5.4.5. Country Effects and Robustness Check 
As shown in summary statistics in Table 2, the pool of country-level factors contains 
various measures about the business and legal system environment and the quality of 
government service, etc. And most of these factors are highly correlated in one given 
country. Many specifications were tried before reaching the final selection of the rule of 
law as country effects control (The result is robust to different specifications). 
  
56 
 
Table 9: Country-Level Factors and tax evasion 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
competition  12.99***  13.10*** 13.14*** 12.93*** 13.05***  13.21*** 11.37*** 
(1.755)  (1.749)  (1.752)  (1.756)  (1.752)  (1.755)  (1.806) 
competition^2 ‐2.490***  ‐2.514*** ‐2.507*** ‐2.476*** ‐2.489***  ‐2.525*** ‐2.220*** 
(0.332)  (0.331)  (0.332)  (0.332)  (0.331)  (0.332)  (0.342) 
audit  ‐6.295***  ‐6.369*** ‐6.011*** ‐6.380*** ‐6.128***  ‐6.176*** ‐6.160*** 
(0.696)  (0.692)  (0.697)  (0.697)  (0.696)  (0.697)  (0.719) 
log(age)  ‐2.872***  ‐3.093*** ‐2.754*** ‐3.045*** ‐2.825***  ‐2.762*** ‐3.406*** 
(0.438)  (0.431)  (0.437)  (0.436)  (0.436)  (0.439)  (0.442) 
size  ‐3.958***  ‐4.046*** ‐4.101*** ‐3.916*** ‐4.021***  ‐4.019*** ‐3.976*** 
(0.300)  (0.299)  (0.301)  (0.300)  (0.299)  (0.300)  (0.306) 
foreign  ‐5.704***  ‐5.538*** ‐5.702*** ‐5.808*** ‐5.830***  ‐5.773*** ‐4.474*** 
(1.076)  (1.073)  (1.074)  (1.076)  (1.074)  (1.075)  (1.102) 
unfair 
practices 
1.826***  1.916*** 1.756*** 1.798*** 1.783***  1.791*** 1.795*** 
(0.298)  (0.297)  (0.297)  (0.298)  (0.297)  (0.298)  (0.305) 
tax rate    0.778**  0.664*  0.592    0.629*  0.598    0.621*  0.224   
(0.371)  (0.368)  (0.369)  (0.370)  (0.369)  (0.369)  (0.378) 
tax 
administration
1.279***  1.268*** 1.431*** 1.392*** 1.449***  1.397*** 1.434*** 
(0.364)  (0.363)  (0.363)  (0.364)  (0.363)  (0.363)  (0.371) 
corruption  5.111***  4.873*** 4.750*** 5.109*** 4.827***  4.897*** 5.204*** 
(0.292)  (0.292)  (0.297)  (0.293)  (0.295)  (0.295)  (0.299) 
access to 
finance 
1.132***  1.220*** 1.123*** 1.059*** 1.075***  1.144*** 0.913*** 
(0.281)  (0.280)  (0.280)  (0.281)  (0.280)  (0.281)  (0.288) 
voice & 
accountability 
‐3.775*** 
           
(0.394) 
political 
stability   
‐5.627***
         
(0.441) 
rule of law  ‐4.820***
(0.442) 
regulation 
quality       
‐3.873***
     
(0.453) 
government efficiency  ‐5.198*** 
(0.478) 
corruption  ‐4.432***
(0.448) 
starting 
procedures             
0.976*** 
(0.114) 
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constant  9.528    18.050    16.170    15.890    15.410    15.090    8.098   
(12.190)  (12.130)  (12.150)  (12.180)  (12.160)  (12.170)  (12.280) 
industry  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  22261    22261    22261    22261    21222    20940      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,   
* p<0.1     
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
 
As shown in the above table, different controls as country-level factors are tried based 
on the basic set up of determinants from the table 6 column (5), six measures are tried to 
capture the effect on tax evasion. With higher value in each measure indicating better 
situation, the empirical results accord to the prediction that, firms in countries with 
sounder legal systems and more efficient governments evade less.  
 
Specifically, for rule of law, regulation quality and government efficiency, these factors 
on macro level affect the probability of detection of tax evasion behaviors, and better 
quality of these situations made evasion a riskier decision. Factors like voice and 
accountability, political stability, corruption, influence domestic firms’ confidence in its 
business environment, whether their profits are immune from unexpected riots, malice, 
or even political crises. When firms fear profits could be taken away, evasion would be 
an alternative to keep money at pocket. Besides, corruption has another indication that 
firms may be able to bribe officials and get things done without formal costs or channels. 
Thus with a more corrupt social environment, firms are more likely to seek a privately 
beneficial way to get things done, and evasion would be easier in such case.  
 
Pigou's public interest theory of regulation states that by means of screening new 
entrants by governments and denying unqualified entrants, consumers are served by 
more desirable goods and services, and thus are better off. This argument is examined 
by Shleifer (2002), who found actually little evidence in favor of it. Here I mainly take 
the point that lower entry costs reflect greater competition, and thus could be an 
indicator of competition. However, entry barrier also serves as a sink cost when 
deciding whether to evade tax and how much. So the higher entry barrier and higher risk 
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associated with tax evasion will deter firms from doing so, firms those have been 
detected of severe evasion will suffer reputation loss, and entrepreneurs might have to 
go though all legal procedures again if they want to start a new business, which will 
deter evasions. After neutralizing these two effects, in empirical results a positive 
association is seen of entry barrier with tax evasion levels, thus indicating the latter 
effect probably dominate firm’s decisions.  
 
Robust standard errors were also tried for the main specification. With clustered 
industry standard errors, all determinants are still significant with expected signs. 
Industry dummies are also significant after controlled for their possible clustering 
effects, showing the robustness of industry effects, which remains unchanged under 
suspicion of correlations within industries.  
 
As in the survey, not all firms choose to respond to the question asking about tax 
evasion, same phenomenon occurs for many other questions as well. However as our 
keen interest, it has to be made clear that there’s no sample selection problem associated 
with the missing data for the evasion measure, it has to be tested whether firms 
intentionally avoid answering this question or not. Based on the basic set up in Table 6 
column (5), I employ other factors into the selection model of choosing to answer or not: 
Unofficial payments to get things done (percentage of annual sales) and gifts expected 
as percent of contract values. Heckman test shows that no significant selection bias for 
the dependent variable, indicating that the missing data is properly distributed and no 
significant system features in choosing to answer the question. Link test probability also 
shows no significant specification errors26.  
 
                                                              
26  Linktest Prob > chi2$=$0.0000, p value for _hat:0.000,for _hatsq:0.506 
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Chapter Six: Policy Implication and Concluding Remarks 
6. Policy Implication and Concluding Remarks 
6.1. Policy Implications  
The erosion of tax base is a fiscal concern of severity in many economies. Effective 
attempts to control the problem of tax evasion remain an important issue for most 
governments.  
 
On firm level, business environment and tax policies affect firms in the same industries 
within a country to the same extent, while individual tax manipulation is a kept-alone 
fruit enjoyed by the firm itself. For instance, loose tax administrations may encourage 
tax evading and make new entries attractive, possibly leading to lower prices provided 
to consumers; However the effect is not symmetric, as illegally-retained tax by one firm 
would not be faced with pressure from other competitors, and retained profit could 
probably flow into the pockets of shareholders, and shared by managers through 
compensation schemes. Although the sharing process remains diverse, abundant 
real-life examples suggest compensation contacts that reward managerial performances 
also reward tax misreporting. As principle-agent issue often renders the judgment of 
performances based on measures such as effective tax rate or net profit comparison, 
therefore encouraging managers to manipulate tax for better performances.   
 
As shown in theoretical hypothesis and reinforced in the empirical findings, competition 
pressure is a driving force for firms to engage in tax evasion activities, however the 
effect is diminishing. Policies designed to promote competition might need to take into 
considerations its adverse effects on tax evasion incentives. Specifically, given that 
firms in more competitive markets tend to have a greater incentive to evade tax, 
additional supervising and detecting measures are needed in such sectors.  
 
Government might take into considerations other factors which encourage tax evasion. 
Firstly, the importance of industries features is among top cautions for evasion issue. 
Firms in certain industries apparently evade more tax, even after controlling for other 
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determinants, for instance leather and transport industry, or agriculture sector.  
 
Firm characteristics may also serve as useful indications for evasion inclinations. 
General speaking, smaller, younger, domestic private firms significantly evade more tax, 
due to the detection probability of evasion for these firms. Much resource needs to be 
put into strengthening administrations for firms in such categories.  
 
Business constraints also provide insights for detecting evasion behaviors and raise tax 
revenues. As business environment and the quality of legal system are relatively 
constant within geographical and administrative regions, tax authorities may utilize 
these observable facts as guidance to predict the tendencies of tax evasion under 
scrutiny. For sure, evasion of tax is only one of the many possible solutions by firms to 
seek compensation from these obstacles. And if not dealt properly, evasion activities 
might evolve into serious social phenomenon and economic crimes.  
 
6.2. Limitations of Study 
This paper provides some insights into the determinants of corporate tax evasion, 
emphasizing on the effect of competition, and its decreasing rate. Yet due to limitation 
in methodology and data, the paper suffers several weaknesses as following: 
 
6.2.1. Methodology Limitations 
This paper mainly discusses the evasion issue of corporate income tax, and does not 
specify different taxes and weights in firm’s tax structure. Lack of considerations for tax 
structure is a potential weakness of this paper. Indirect taxes for instance value added 
tax, is quite divergent from the theoretical coverage of this paper, and also, not all 
countries in this paper’s data adopt value added tax, which hinders empirical attempts.  
 
As different types of taxes comprise the total corporate taxability, with diverse 
determinants for each type of tax, examining into the total effects from one factor might 
be hard to implement. As the fraction of each tax varies within firms and industries, 
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different regulations and natures of taxes further produce complications or even 
contradictions, predictions drawn on comprehensive tax structure may lack conciseness 
or reliability. Existing literature on tax evasion has empirically estimated specific forms 
of taxes, while theoretical work mostly analyzes effects of one certain type of tax with 
respect to corporate finance or management incentives.  
 
As the famous "self-reinforcing penalty system of taxes" by Shoup (1969) suggests, just 
by auditing one tax return, the extent of tax evasion could be checked comprehensively. 
Reasons lie in the evident relationships among tax bases of interrelated taxes including: 
Capital gains tax, income tax, expenditure tax, wealth tax and inheritance and donations 
tax. Also, taxpayers are aware of the possibilities of self-revealing in presence of 
cross-checking when evasion activities are committed, thus attention will be paid to 
conceal true tax bases in related items. Esteller-Moré (2005) examined the theory and 
proved it holds as long as taxes are administrated by a single tax authority or authorities 
with high level of collaborations. The congruity within related taxes could to some 
extent relieve the problem of lacking assumptions of tax structure.   
 
Besides, considering the recent trend to introduce contractual relationship between 
shareholder and managers into corporate income tax evasion, this paper lacks 
addressing to this issue. The cross-country background also complicates the attempt to 
combine theoretical predictions with empirical testing, as many firms in this paper’s 
data are small-sized and do not fit for analyzing agency problems, despite modern 
corporate theories would suggest. For a quick look, public-listed companies take up 
only 5% of the total surveyed firms, therefore, it is still reasonable to adopt the A-S 
model for corporate tax evasion, as Marrelli (1984) also did. 
 
6.2.2. Data Limitations 
Constrained by the main data from the Productivity and the Investment Climate Private 
Enterprise Survey, the measurement of competition lacks preciseness due to the design 
of questionnaire questions, and the anonymous firm-level data could not be 
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complemented by other sources once after the survey. It would be desirable if the 
unique measurement of competition is designed to ask the exact percentage of quantities 
demanded change if price rise by 10%, or it would be perfect to ask directly for price 
elasticity or product substitutability. However exact figures could remain unknown even 
to the surveyed firms. Other possible measures of competition such as the number of 
competitors, suffers from severe problem of data missing and cannot be utilized.  
 
As to the measure of tax evasion, the design of the question asks namely about a typical 
firm’s evasion information in its industry, but not directly on the survey’s firm itself. As 
discussed already in section 5.2, this measurement serves roughly yet creditably for 
survey’s firm’s own tax behaviors as explained in previous section.  
 
Actual tax rates, which could be important factor influencing evasion behaviors, are 
employed mainly from marginal highest corporate income tax rates in the covered 
countries. Admitting the fact that firms face difference taxes and diverse marginal rates, 
the measurement could be rough. Again limited by the survey design, it’s not possible to 
retrieve the information on the main tax or main tax rate level for each surveyed firm, 
and only rough proxy could be used in this context. Further research focuses on specific 
country or utilizing surveys with rich information at firm-levels are promising to further 
explore the effects of actual tax rates.  
 
6.3. Concluding Remarks 
In the paper, I re-visited the tax evasion model developed by Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972), and derived the diminishing positive effect of competition on the incentives to 
evade tax. More specific form of punishment is also derived, with results according to 
common intuition that more severe punishment deters evasion incentives. 
 
I empirically tested competition’s effect, together with other hypothesized effects from 
firm characteristics and business constraints, using a comprehensive dataset covering 
rich cross-country firm-level data (PICPES, carried out by World Bank) during 2002 to 
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2005. Empirical results confirmed the effects predicted in the hypotheses.  
 
This paper may provide some insights for governments and tax authorities in designing 
tax policies and enhancing tax administrations. Industry and firm characteristics must be 
taken into consideration in supervising and reducing tax evasion activities; Policies 
designed to promote competition must also strengthen infrastructure and supervision to 
avoid its possible adverse effects on tax evasion incentives. 
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7. Appendices 
7.1. Country List and Variables Definitions 
Table 10: Country List and Observations 
Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 Obs Surveyed Year 
Albania 170 204 374 2002,2005 
Algeria 557       557 2002 
Armenia 171 351 522 2002,2005 
Azerbaijan 170 350 520 2002,2005 
Bangladesh 1,001       1001 2002 
Belarus 250 325 575 2002,2005 
Benin 197       197 2004 
BiH 182 200 382 2002,2005 
Brazil 1,642       1642 2003 
Bulgaria 250 548 300 1098 2002,2004,2005
Cambodia 503       503 2003 
Chile 948       948 2004 
China 1,548 2,400       3948 2002,2003 
Costa Rica 343 343 2005 
Croatia 187 236 423 2002,2005 
Czech 268 343 611 2002,2005 
Ecuador 453       453 2003 
Egypt 977       977 2004 
El Salvador 465       465 2003 
Eritrea 79       79 2002 
Estonia 170 219 389 2002,2005 
Ethiopia 427       427 2002 
FYROM 170 200 370 2002,2005 
Georgia 174 200 374 2002,2005 
Germany 1,196 1196 2005 
Greece 546 546 2005 
Guatemala 455       455 2003 
Guyana 163       163 2004 
Honduras 450       450 2003 
Hungary 250 610 860 2002,2005 
India 1,827       1827 2002 
Indonesia 713       713 2003 
Ireland 501 501 2005 
Kazakhstan 250 585 835 2002,2005 
Kenya 284       284 2003 
Kosovo 329       329 2003 
Kyrgyzstan 173 102 202 477 2002,2003,2005
Latvia 176 205 381 2002,2005 
Lithuania 200 239 205 644 2002,2004,2005
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Table10. Country List and Observations (Cont.d) 
Madagascar 293 293 2005 
Malawi 160 160 2005 
Mali 155       155 2003 
Mauritius 212 212 2005 
Moldova 174 103 350 627 2002,2003,2005
Montenegro 100       100 2003 
Morocco 850       850 2004 
Nicaragua 452       452 2003 
Oman 337       337 2003 
Pakistan 965       965 2002 
Peru 576       576 2002 
Philippines 716       716 2003 
Poland 500 108 975 1583 2002,2003,2005
Portugal 505 505 2005 
Romania 255 600 855 2002,2005 
Russia 506 601 1107 2002,2005 
Senegal 262       262 2002 
Serbia 408       408 2002 
Serbia & Montenegro 250 300 550 2002,2005 
Slovakia 170 220 390 2002,2005 
Slovenia 188 223 411 2002,2005 
South Africa 603       603 2003 
South Korea 598 598 2005 
Spain 606 606 2005 
Sri Lanka 452       452 2004 
Syria 560       560 2002 
Tajikistan 176 107 200 483 2002,2003,2005
Tanzania 276       276 2003 
Thailand 1,385       1385 2004 
Turkey 514 1,880 2394 2002,2005 
Uganda 300       300 2003 
Ukraine 463 594 1057 2002,2005 
Uzbekistan 260 100 300 660 2002,2003,2005
Vietnam 1,650 1650 2005 
Zambia 207           207 2002 
 
 
66 
 
 
Table 11: Definitions and Sources of Utilized Variables 
Variable   Definition   Source  
evasion 
Survey question: Recognizing the difficulties many 
enterprises face in fully complying with taxes and 
regulations, what percentage of total sales would you 
estimate the typical establishment in your area of 
activity reports for tax purposes?  
Productivity and 
the investment 
climate private 
enterprise 
survey(PICPES) 
competition 
If prices of your main product line or main line of 
services were raised 10% above current level in the 
domestic market, which would best describe the result 
assuming that your competitors maintained their 
current prices? Our customers would:(1)continue to 
buy from us in same quantities (2)continue to buy 
from us, but at slightly lower quantities (3)continue to 
buy from us, but at much lower quantities (4)stop 
buying from us.  
 PICPES  
business 
constraint: 
unfair practices 
Judge if anti-competitive or informal practices is a 
problem for the operation and growth of your 
business: (1)No obstacle (2)minor obstacle (3)Major 
obstacle (4)very severe obstacle 
PICPES  
business 
constraint: tax 
rate 
Judge if tax rates is a problem for the operation and 
growth of your business: (1)No obstacle (2)minor 
obstacle (3)Major obstacle (4)very severe obstacle 
PICPES  
business 
constraint: tax 
administration 
Judge if tax administration is a problem for the 
operation and growth of your business: (1)No obstacle 
(2)minor obstacle (3)Major obstacle (4)very severe 
obstacle 
PICPES  
business 
constraint: 
corruption 
Judge if corruption is a problem for the operation and 
growth of your business: (1)No obstacle (2)minor 
obstacle (3)Major obstacle (4)very severe obstacle 
PICPES  
business 
constraint: 
access to finance
Judge if access to finance is a problem for the 
operation and growth of your business: (1)No obstacle 
(2)minor obstacle (3)Major obstacle (4)very severe 
obstacle 
PICPES 
informal 
financing 
Please identify the contribution over the last year of 
informal sources (eg. money lender) for your 
establishment 
PICPES  
bank financing Please identify the contribution(in percentage) over the last year of banks sources for your establishment PICPES  
audit Annual financial statement reviewed by external auditor? (1)Yes (2)No  PICPES  
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age  Number of years since your firm began operations in this country   PICPES  
size  
 Size measurement based on permanent workers plus 
temps(where duration available): (1)micro (2)small 
(3)medium (4)large (5)very large  
 PICPES  
foreign   Dummy equals 1 if ownership is foreign, and 0 for domestic firms   PICPES  
sector   If firm is in:(1)Manufacture (2)Services (3)Agriculture (4)Construction (5)Other industry   PICPES  
Industry 
Dummies for categories that the firm is mainly 
operating in, total 29 classifications, such as Food, 
Metals and machinery, Retail and wholesale trade, etc. 
PICPES  
voice & 
accountability 
The extent to which country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a 
free media.  
 WGI  
political stability
The perceptions of the likelihood that the government 
will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional 
or violent means, including domestic violence and 
terrorism. 
WGI  
regulatory 
quality 
The ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound Policies and regulations that permit 
and promote private sector development. 
WGI  
government 
efficiency 
The quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from 
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to such policies. 
WGI  
starting 
procedures  
Number of procedures required to start up a typical 
business in one country.  
DoingBusiness, 
by the World 
Bank  
recovery rate  Recovery rate when closing a business in one country.  DoingBusiness 
rule of law 
 The extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, in particular the quality 
of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as 
well as the likelihood of crime and violence.  
World Governess 
Indicators(WGI) 
marginal highest 
tax rate Marginal highest corporate income tax rate 
World 
Development 
Indicators & 
KPMG 
International 
shadow 
economy The ratio of shadow economy output to GDP Schneider 2004 
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7.2. Proofs for equation equations (9) to (13): 
(9): Differentiate equation (2): െݐሺ1 െ ݌ሻܷᇱሺܻሻ ൅ ൫ߙ— ݐ൯݌ܷᇱሺܼሻ ൌ 0 with respect 
to :  
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כ
Π ቁ
߲Πଶ
ൌ
1
Πଷܦ
ሼΠሾݐሺ1 െ ݌ሻܷ"(Y)(1-t
∂X
∂Π
)-(α-t)pU"ሺܼሻሾ1 െ ߙ ൅ ሺߙ െ ݐሻ
߲ܺ
߲Π
ሿ
െ 2ሾݐሺ1 െ ݌ሻܷ"(Y)Y-(α-t)pU"ሺܼሻܼሿሽ  
ൌ
1
Πଷܦ
൜ݐሺ1 െ ݌ሻߨ ൬1 െ ݐ
߲ݔ
߲ߨ
൰ ܷᇱᇱሺܻሻ െ 2ݐሺ1 െ ݌ሻܷᇱᇱሺܻሻܻ
െ ሺߙ െ ݐሻ݌ߨܷᇱᇱሺܼሻ ൤1 െ ߙ ൅ ሺߙ െ ݐሻ
߲ݔ
߲ߨ
൨ ൅ 2ሺߙ െ ݐሻ݌ܷᇱᇱሺܼሻܼൠ
ൌ
1
π3D
ቈ
ሺt െ αሻαpሺt െ 1ሻUԢԢሺzሻtሺ1 െ pሻπUԢԢሺYሻ
t2ሺ1 െ pሻUԢԢሺYሻ ൅ ሺα െ tሻ2pUԢԢሺZሻ
െ 2tሺ1 െ pሻUԢԢሺYሻY
െ
ሺt െ αሻαpሺt െ 1ሻUԢԢሺzሻtሺ1 െ pሻπUԢԢሺYሻ
t2ሺ1 െ pሻUԢԢሺYሻ ൅ ሺα െ tሻ2pUԢԢሺZሻ
൅ 2ሺα െ tሻpUԢԢሺZሻZ቉
ൌ
1
ߨଷܦ
ሾെ2ݐሺ1 െ ݌ሻܷᇱᇱሺܻሻܻ ൅ 2ሺߙ െ ݐሻ݌ܷᇱᇱሺܼሻܼሿ
ൌ െ
2
ΠଷD
ሾtሺ1 െ pሻUᇱᇱሺYሻY െ ሺα െ tሻpUᇱᇱሺZሻZሿ 
 
The form above is exactly equation (13), then rewrite as: 
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߲ଶ ቀܺ
כ
Π ቁ
߲Πଶ
ൌ െ
2
ΠଷD
ሾtሺ1 െ pሻUᇱᇱሺYሻY െ ሺα െ tሻpUᇱᇱሺZሻZሿ
ൌ
2
ΠଶD
tሺ1 െ pሻUᇱሺYሻሾRRሺYሻ െ RRሺZሻሿ ൏ 0 
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